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Chapter 1-Introduction 
Ideas and the construction of ideas matter. However, these ideas and process must be 
contextualized and understood analytically. Ideas include norms, identity, culture, and 
values. I analyze Hezbollah’s role as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East. Since 
World War II the term “Middle East has slipped into popular use […], and though there 
remains divergences over its extension, both as whether it should be narrower, to exclude 
African Arab States west of Egypt, or broader to include (among others) the Muslim 
republics of Central Asia,” a compromise definition is usually favoured.”1 Despite the 
plurality of claims, I have adopted Fawcett’s version of the Middle East which is 
understood to include the Arab countries of West Asia and North Africa, members of the 
Arab League, Iran, Turkey and Israel. Despite no geographical closeness, Fawcett 
maintains that the Middle East “possesses certain distinctive ‘systemic’ properties and 
unifying characteristics.”2 The question driving my research is: how does Hezbollah 
function as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East? More specifically, how does 
Hezbollah create the norm of resistance?  
                  I argue that Hezbollah functions as a norm entrepreneur by constructing and 
physically manifesting ideas. Material resistance as a norm is created through 
institutionalized ideas, such as the concept of jihad, martyrdom, the oppressed/oppressor 
dichotomy, and anti-imperialism. Hezbollah is continuously constructing the norm of 
resistance while the party itself is the physical expression of resistance. Ideas are then 
operationalized and performed. What Hezbollah is resisting is the political order of the 
                                                          
1 Louise Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East, (New York: Oxford  
  University Press, 2005), 2.   
2 Fawcett, 2. 
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world. It is variously categorized as a movement that is anti-globalization, anti-
imperialist, anti-Western, and more importantly anti-Zionist.
3
 Resistance, as constructed 
by Hezbollah, is the necessary means to challenge the global order and this is believed to 
be achieved through struggle. Opposition or resistance to the status quo, as defined by the 
status quo powers (the West, the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states, and Israel), is 
rejected and does not include the instrument of violence as a legitimate means for change. 
Therefore, the approach Hezbollah utilizes is not welcomed, and virtually from its 
inception the “Party of God” has been strictly policed. The most obvious example of this 
policing was the US State Department’s 1997 inclusion of Hezbollah on its list of 
“foreign terrorist organizations.”4 
 
Theory 
Social constructivism fills the analytical gap left by neorealism and neoliberalism by 
accentuating identity, norms, and the social construction of anarchy in global politics. 
Materialism is assumed by neorealists and neoliberals to take precedence over ideas. 
Material factors include war, gold, tanks, warships, military prowess, oil, bombs, and 
economic superiority.
5
 Constructivism, however, adopts social theory as an approach to 
global politics. Social theory stresses politics, economics, history, culture, and institutions 
                                                          
3 Dominique Avon and Anais Khatchadourian, trans. Jane Marie Todd,  
  Hezbollah: a History of the Party of God (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard  
  University Press, 2012), 134. 
4
 Avon and Khatchadourian, 3. 
5 Alexander Wendt (a), “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20,   
  no. 1 (1995): 4. 
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that are assumed to be humanly defined not naturally defined.
6
 Constructivism holds that 
the world is socially constructed, composed of thoughts, beliefs, interpretations, and 
presentations. A state’s interpretation or perception of what constitutes a threat will differ 
from one state’s interpretation or perception to another’s. In essence, ideas are what 
construct the social world and global politics, and not material factors. Thus, from a 
constructivist viewpoint the world is built by human consciousness.
7
 Consequently, 
constructivism suggests that the world can change and is not handicapped by a natural 
anarchy or fear of war. The exchanges of ideas and interactions among agents allows for 
the world to be continuously under construction.
8
 Agents of construction may include 
states, sub-state groups, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and 
transnational organizations. 
     Constructivism shares with neorealism the assumption that states are the 
principal unit of analysis. However, constructivism attempts to understand the behaviour 
of states by highlighting identity, norms, and institutions. Neorealists assert that states 
have only one identity which is self-interest. Moreover, neorealists maintain that states 
are interested in power politics. Constructivism counters by arguing that state identities 
and interests are constructed by social structures.
9
 Also, identities and interests are 
endogenous to the international system and are developed through interaction. Equally 
important, state identities and interests change over time. That is, identities and interests 
are socially constructed and not fixed. In addition, an agent may have multiple identities 
                                                          
6
 Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations:  
  Theories and Approaches, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 209. 
7
 Jackson and Sorensen, 209. 
8
 Jackson and Sorensen, 209. 
9
 Alexander Wendt (b), “Collective Identity Formation and the International  
  State,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 385. 
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at one time such as being democratic and capitalist, with Islam being the official state 
religion. Constructivists contend that small states such as Nepal, for example, would not 
be interested in power politics or self-help. Furthermore, relationships among states 
mature and are mutually constituted through meanings, interests, and norms. 
Subsequently, if identity and norms are analytically neglected then interaction and 
“exercises of power, or actions,” amongst states are rendered meaningless.10 Thus, in the 
world constructed of anarchy, identity becomes imperative in state relations. As Wendt 
lucidly puts it: “an anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies.”11 Therefore, it is 
important to know and understand the identity of the Other.
12
 In a nutshell, not all states 
share the same interests or have the same identity and “it would be extraordinarily 
wasteful to treat every state as though it posed the same potential threat or offered the 
same potential opportunities.”13  
     The construction of norms are another significant strength of constructivism. 
Norms expressed in international institutions help to define, socialize, and persuade states 
to behave in a particular manner.
14
 The norm of sovereignty has been constructed and 
reconstructed throughout history. Sovereignty is the notion that states are independent 
and equal. There are internalized norms of behaviour, such as the norm of non-
                                                          
10 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,”  
   International Security 23, no. 1: 173.   
11
 Wendt (a), 78.  
12 Paul A. Kowart, “The Peril and Promise of Constructivist Theory,” Ritsumeikan  
  Journal of International Studies 13, no.3: 159. 
13
 Kowart, 159.  
14 Ian Hurd (a), “Constructivism,” The Oxford Handbook of International 
   Relations, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 1-19. (Oxford:   
   Oxford UP, 2008), 304.        
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interventionism.
15
 The construction of supreme power or legitimacy over a state’s borders 
was challenged following Rwanda’s genocide in 1994. This is understood to be the norm 
emergence of the responsibility to protect. The supreme authority of the state over its 
borders is challenged if the state is incapable of protecting its citizens. Sovereignty is 
challenged in the event of real or suggested genocide or mass atrocities.
16
 It is the 
responsibility of the international community to intervene to protect those in danger, 
effectively violating the norm of sovereignty. Sovereignty has become redefined and no 
longer provides immunity from intervention. The norm of responsibility to protect was 
internalized in 2005. 
17
 Neorealists do not recognize changes in state attitudes or 
behaviour and neoliberals explain changes in behaviour through the virtue of cooperation. 
Norms are not part of their individual ontology. Finnemore argues that identity and 
interests are explained by “international forces,” or by the norms of behaviour entrenched 
in “international society.”18 The norms of international society are communicated to 
states through international organizations. Norms shape “national policies by ‘teaching’ 
states what their interests should be.”19  
     I deploy social constructivism because it allows me to see Hezbollah from a 
unique perspective, otherwise not possible from a neorealist or neoliberal standpoint. 
“Anarchy is what States Make of it” is the title of Alexander Wendt’s seminal work on 
                                                          
15
 Alain De Benoist, trans., “What is Sovereignty?,” Telos, no. 116: 100.  
16
 “Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,” United Nations, 
     accessed December 20, 2015,   
      http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.  
17
 “Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.” 
18
 Jackson and Sorensen, 218.  
19
 Jackson and Sorensen, 218. 
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the essential pillar of neorealism, anarchy.
20
 Neorealists argue that anarchy is the same 
for all actors, that is, that there is no central authority above the state. Kenneth Waltz 
adds that actors must resort to self-help to fend off potential threats.
21
 Wendt agrees with 
Waltz claim, but asserts that anarchy is socially constructed. Moreover, if actors have 
multiple identities not all states can be perceived or constructed as threats. By extension, 
having multiple identities means that different actors will have different understandings 
of one another.
22
 Effectively, having different understandings means that states will 
interact differently with one another. Wendt, for example, states that “500 British nuclear 
weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, 
because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and 
amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings.”23 This illustration is reflective of 
the example stated above that an anarchy of friends differs tremendously from an anarchy 
of enemies. This is due to identity which is constructed through interactions. The 
constructed understanding the United States has of Great Britain is one of friendship, but 
with North Korea one of enmity. Despite the smaller amount of nuclear warheads North 
Korea has compared to Great Britain, the United States would find the North Koreans far 
more threatening. Who a state is or the norm it identifies with is critical in global politics. 
Moreover, Hopf argues that the implementation of trade agreements, for instance, “where 
actors do not worry much about the potential costs of ceding control over outcomes” to 
other actors or institutions, illustrates “a realm of world politics where neorealist ideas of 
                                                          
20
 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction  
   of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no.2 (1992): 391-425. 
21
 Jackson and Sorensen, 174. 
22 Jackson and Sorensen, 174.  
23 Wendt, 73.  
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anarchy are just imaginary.”24 Therefore, social constructivism provides a distinct 
opportunity to study Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. It allows me to study Hezbollah 
using social ontology employed by constructivism. This is in contrast to neorealism’s and 
neoliberal’s individual ontology. More specifically, utilizing social constructivism allows 
me to analyze norms, ideas, values, and identities ignored by neorealist and neoliberal 
analyses. Constructivism allows me to study sub-state groups and other non-state actors 
in global politics which are ignored by neorealists. Stated simply, neorealism is unable to 
study Hezbollah. Neorealism’s principal unit of analysis is the state.25 Non-state actors 
such as Hezbollah are effectively exempted from neorealist analysis. Neoliberalism’s 
approach does not allow me to study Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur, as neoliberalism 
does not recognize the social construction of norms in global politics. My novel 
contribution to the research already conducted on Hezbollah is to study the non-state 
actor as an agent of norm construction. 
 
Norm Entrepreneurship 
Norms are defined as values that outline the proper way for agents with a given identity 
to behave. Norms are intimately involved with identity and identity formation, as they 
standardize behaviour using rules.
26
 For example, liberal democracies are associated with 
promoting and protecting human rights. The protection of human rights has become an 
                                                          
24
 Hopf, 174. 
25 John J. Mearsheimer (a), “Structural Realism.” In International Relations       
   Theories: Discipline and Diversity, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki , and   
   Steve Smith, 77-94. 3
rd
 Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 79. 
26 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and  
   Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4: 891. 
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integral element to any state that claims the identity of liberal democracy. A state cannot 
claim to be democratic without respecting or advocating human rights. This is an 
example of identity and norms being mutually constituted and how norms outline the 
proper way in which states or agents should behave. If states do not follow a particular 
norm such as human rights while adopting an identity such as being democratic then they 
run the risk of being ostracized by the international society.  
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, there is a typology of norms, including 
regulative and constitutive. Regulative norms regulate existing norms or rules. The World 
Trade Organization, for example, serves to regulate trade among states. By effectively 
regulating rules on trade, the World Trade Organization is regulating state relations and 
behaviour.
27
 Constitutive norms, on the other hand, refer to the formation of actors, 
interests or categories of action.
28
 The instance of sovereignty as a norm regulates state 
practices, but these very rules are what constitute a sovereign state. Constitutive norms 
give meaning to regulative norms and are mutually constituted.
29
 Norms are not made in 
a vacuum, Finnemore and Sikkink argue, but “emerge in a highly contested normative 
space where they must compete with other norms.”30 Norms are propagated by what are 
known as norm entrepreneurs.  
     Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm creation. “Norm entrepreneurs are 
critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even “create” issues 
                                                          
27
 Michael N. Barnett, “Social Constructivism” in The Globalization of World  
   Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, edited by John Baylis, Steve 
   Smith, and Patricia Owens, 150-164. 5
th
 Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),     
   152.                         
28
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 891.  
29
 Barnett, 152-3.  
30
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 897. 
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by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.”31 Norm entrepreneurs are 
convinced that an existing norm is inappropriate and in need of a change. Again, the 
norm of sovereignty offers an elucidating example. Following the atrocities in the mid-
1990s, such as the Rwandan genocide, a new norm, known as the responsibility to 
protect, was constructed.
32
 According to this norm, while states remain the sole authority 
within their borders once they violate fundamental norms such as human rights or begin 
to commit atrocities such as genocide or ethnic cleansing against their own citizenry, then 
the international community has a responsibility to intervene, consequently violating the 
norm of sovereignty.
33
 Norm entrepreneurs are driven by empathy, altruism, and 
ideational commitment. Many states may adopt a norm for political reasons and to 
enhance their domestic legitimacy. Empathy is the notion of feeling for others. This 
interconnectedness leads actors to care for the well-being of others even if it does not 
entail any benefits for the entrepreneur. Altruism is benefiting the other at the expense of 
oneself. The core of altruism lies in the notion that all people, as human beings, have 
rights and share common characteristics. Ideational commitment is the belief in the ideals 
of the new norm, even if the new norm under construction entails no effect on the 
entrepreneur. However, Finnemore and Sikkink are quick to remind that many norm 
entrepreneurs do not necessarily “act against their interests,” but rather act in “accordance 
with a redefined understanding of their interests.”34 For example, de jure sovereign states 
had to be convinced that the authority they have been enjoying may be revoked if they 
violate the rights of their citizenry. Likewise, the International Red Cross had to persuade 
                                                          
31
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 897. 
32
 Barnett,163.    
33 Jackson and Sorensen, 149. 
34 Finnemore and Sikkink, 898. 
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military leaders that protecting the injured during war, for example, was in line with their 
war aims.
35
            
     Norms have what Finnemore and Sikkink call a lifecycle. The life cycle has 
three stages. The first stage is norm emergence and is often led by organizations or 
epistemic communities. To replace an existing norm with an alternative, norm 
entrepreneurs are required to have an organizational platform to persuade policy-makers 
that the current norm is outdated and no longer appropriate.
36
 A platform may already be 
in existence, such as a media outlet.
37
 Equally important, is that occasionally norm 
entrepreneurs may have to act inappropriately to gain the attention of decision-makers to 
enact a new norm. Examples of such inappropriate behaviour include civil disobedience, 
refusal to pay taxes, hunger strikes, and vandalism of government property to gain the 
attention or interests of policy-makers. The Civil Rights Movement and the fight for 
international suffrage exhibited civil disobedience.
38
 There is no precise timeline for 
norm emergence, as some new norms may take several years to reach the “tipping point.” 
A norm may either successfully continue to the next stage of the norm lifecycle (ascend) 
reaching the tipping point or fail to reach the second stage of the lifecycle (descend). 
Empirically, the authors contend that if enough critical states and one-third of all states 
adopt the new norm, then it will likely reach the norm cascade, or stage two of the norm 
lifecycle.
39
 Critical states are not Western countries or the advanced economies of the 
                                                          
35
 Finnemore and Sikkink 899. 
36
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 899. 
37
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 896.  
38 Finnemore and Sikkink, 897. 
39 Finnemore and Sikkink, 901. 
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world per se, but countries that have stakes in a new norm being created. For instance, the 
norm of sovereignty affects all states recognized as sovereign but not all equally. 
     Norm cascade is the second stage of the norm lifecycle. This is the moment 
when agents are compelled to adopt the new norm because of an agent’s legitimacy, 
reputation, and/or esteem. In this stage, states begin adopting the norm swiftly through 
“socialization” by NGOs, states, and other organizational platforms. The pressure to 
adopt the new norm is sufficient, as most states prefer to be norm followers and a part of 
the so-called “international community” rather than norm breakers. For example, a liberal 
democratic state will be inclined to adopt a norm relating to human rights which would 
further increase its legitimacy, reputation, and esteem. The norm cascade moment is 
intertwined with a state’s identity. Slightly before stage three in the norm lifecycle, the 
peer-pressure on decision-makers and the naming and shaming through socialization
40
 “to 
make the right choice” becomes so detrimental that the identity and behaviour of non-
compliant states is questioned. The cascading norm must be adopted to re-legitimatize 
and protect a state’s identity and esteem if it is to remain a member in good standing of 
the international society.
41
  
     The final stage in the norm lifecycle is internalization. Professionals, 
bureaucracies, and international law integrate the norm, subsequently making the norm 
habitual and institutionalized.  Following the norm cascade stage, the new norm is 
adopted without much thought or objection. Consequently, it becomes internalized.  
Sovereignty, human rights, and the responsibility to protect are examples of internalized 
                                                          
40
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 902-3.  
41 Finnemore and Sikkink, 903-4.  
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norms that have been socially constructed and institutionalized.
42
 These norms, among 
others, have been launched by entrepreneurs and/or professionals, who, through 
persuasion and socialization, have successfully updated an existing norm.    
     Which norms matter is important to the process of norm construction. States or 
non-state actors will be more willing to adopt a new norm when their domestic legitimacy 
is under scrutiny. Furthermore, some norms are more successful than others due to 
prominence. “Norms held by states widely viewed as successful and desirable models are 
thus likely to become prominent and diffuse”43 because of the image and power of these 
agents. For example, human rights, sovereignty, and the responsibility to protect are all 
norms valued by the West and have become institutionalized by the allure of the United 
States and other Western states. Norms that have intrinsic qualities are also likely to be 
successful. Keck and Sikkink argue that intrinsic norms are cross-cutting and affect all 
states. Norms relating to human dignity common to most cultures or issues aiming to 
protect minority groups from bodily harm or women’s suffrage are examples of intrinsic 
norms.
44
 More specifically, an example of an intrinsic norm is the effects of smoking and 
secondhand smoke. Exposing the vulnerable or innocent bystanders to secondhand smoke 
is intrinsic in nature because it poses a serious health risk to any citizen, irrespective of 
his or her culture. When the apparent dangers associated with secondhand smoking 
became widely known this helped to propel an intrinsic norm against the habit of 
smoking.
45
 Next, adjacent or norms succeeding older norms are also likely to succeed. 
Norm entrepreneurs work tirelessly to conjoin their issues with prevailing norms and 
                                                          
42 Finnemore and Sikkink, 904-5.  
43
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 906. 
44
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 906-7.  
45
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 907. 
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emergent norms.
46
 Lastly, world time may help norms advance. Following wars, shocks, 
or depressions, Sikkink and Finnemore suggest, states begin to seek new norms. New 
norms may replace existing norms adhered to by the losing side of a war. An example of 
world time would be the conclusion of the Cold War and Russia’s adoption of neoliberal 
policies. Following the collapse of state communism in Eastern Europe, the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, and consequently the end of the Cold War, Russia adopted 
neoliberal policies, including privatization and currency devaluation. Many became rich 
overnight, while many more were severely impoverished. This example of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union illustrates how a country reacts to a shock, such as the 
economic collapse of the Soviet Union and then proceeds to accept emerging norms, such 
as neoliberal economics.
47
 Due to the processes of globalization, new norms are now 
moving through the three stages of norm entrepreneurship quicker than before, 
accelerating the lifecycle.
48
 The process of norm construction, with its lifecycle, agents, 
motives and mechanisms, is represented in Table 1.1.      
                                        Stage 1       Tipping Point        Stage 2               Stage 3                     
                                            
Norm Cycle Norm Emergence Norm ‘Cascade’ 
 
Internalization 
Actors Norm entrepreneurs w/ 
organizational platforms 
States, Intl organizations, 
networks  
 
Law, Professionals, 
bureaucracy 
Motives Altruism, empathy, 
ideational commitment 
Legitimacy, reputation, 
esteem 
Conformity (conform to 
the international 
community) 
Dominant Mechanisms Persuasion Socialization, 
Institutionalization, 
demonstration  
Habit, institutionalization 
Table1.1: Three Essential Stages of Norm Entrepreneurship.    
                                                          
46
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 908.  
47 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (New York:      
   Metropolitan /Henry Holt, 2007), 564 and 585.   
48
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 909. 
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Source: Martha Finnemore and Katheryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4: 896.                                                            
     Social constructivism allows for analysis of interactive processes among 
agents. It forces global politics not to be understood as given, but rather as an ongoing 
construction of norms, ideas, culture, values, and identity. Constructivism’s social 
ontology allows us to better understand reality or rather helps us to place meaning to 
something. Constructivism allows for the world to be seen as a project continuously 
under construction. By extension, the norm of resistance and the neorealist assumption of 
anarchy are socially constructed. Constructivism’s approach to global politics is unique.  
     Through the social construction of ideas, meanings, and norms, I analyze 
Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. Constructivism provides a critical and dynamic 
account of Hezbollah and this analysis is a valuable supplement to the spartan corpus of 
constructivist studies of Hezbollah. Constructivist analysis allows me to study Hezbollah 
as a norm entrepreneur, socially constructing the norm of resistance.  
 
Concepts and definitions. The concepts of Hezbollah’s ideology, including resistance, 
legitimacy, and infitah, require definition. Charles Tripp avers that resistance is implied 
in a relation of power. Where power is, resistance must also be present. However, both 
resistance and power share an inverse relationship, whereby those in power reject those 
who resist. Power, like resistance, is a relation between political actors. Similar to 
diachronic shifts in ideology, this relationship also changes, moulded by the shifting 
context of political activity and by the need for power.
49
 An example of such a shift in 
                                                          
49 Charles Tripp, The power and the people: paths of resistance in the Middle  
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context was in a speech presented by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah, in 2011, in which he extolled Hezbollah and the Syrian army, but condemned 
the uprisings against the Ba’athist government.50 The norm of resistance is the 
contestation of space, material and discursive. That is, resistance takes on ideas, 
meanings, messages, and themes, but is also materially expressed on the battlefield where 
a resistance movement, such as Hezbollah, is needed to obtain the “material conditions 
for contesting the power structure in a given space.”51 Resistance is also an action that 
requires the construction of an organizational platform, such as Hezbollah’s TV network, 
Al-Manar. Resistance is a struggle aimed at achieving change against domination.
52
 
According to Hezbollah, resistance is a struggle against the social construction of 
oppression, humiliation, and occupation of Arab and Muslim lands. Today, it is a struggle 
against neo-colonialism and the Zionist project, including its usurpation of Arab lands 
and water. Resistance is integral to Hezbollah’s identity. The Party of God’s principal 
party organ is its military wing. A former Hezbollah activist explains how critical 
resistance is: “‘Resistance is like a one-wheel[ed] bike that [Hezbollah] is riding. If it 
stops pedaling, it falls’.”53 
Ian Hurd defines legitimacy as the normative belief of an agent that a rule or 
institution must be obeyed. Legitimacy is subjective and relational between the actor and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
   East, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 6. 
50 Tripp, 8. 
51
 Walid El Houri, “The Meaning of Resistance and Hezbollah’s Media Strategies and the      
   Articulation of a People,” (PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 2012), 49. 
52 El Houri, 49 and 50. 
53 Emile El-Hokayem, “Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship,”  
   The Washington Quarterly 30, no.2: 44. 
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the institution. It is construed by the actor’s perception of the institution.54 The actor’s 
perception may be derived from the process by which the rule was established. The 
actor’s perception affects behaviour because it is adopted by the actor and helps to define 
how the actor sees its interests.
55
 In a nutshell, legitimacy is the widespread belief that the 
actions of an agent are desirable, decent, or apt within a “‘socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’.”56 Indeed, a lack of legitimacy is costly to any 
organization which requires discipline, devotion, and political support, such as 
Hezbollah. Those in power require legitimacy to validate their rule.
57
 Without legitimacy, 
authority is met with greater resistance. Furthermore, in the absence of legitimacy, norm 
construction becomes a difficult task. For an emerging norm to become acceptable, such 
as resistance, it must be exercised or manifested by an agent that is perceived to be 
legitimate. The identity and legitimacy of a norm entrepreneur is intimately connected to 
the norms it wishes to construct. The construction of being perceived as legitimate is 
important to those in power and/or seeking to construct new norms. Hezbollah has 
achieved legitimacy through elections and through its policies of infitah and 
Lebanonization. The Party of God understands that the construction of legitimacy cannot 
be confined to its local constituency in the south, but rather must extend to all Lebanese, 
regardless of sectarian identity. It constructs itself as a resistance movement that is 
resistant to the corruption and nepotism that have plagued Lebanon for years.  
                                                          
54
 Ian Hurd(b), “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International  
   Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 381 
55 Hurd (b), 381. 
56
 Mark Suchman qtd. in Hurd (b), 387.    
57
 Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom qtd. in Hurd (b), 388.  
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Hezbollah enacted infitah as a policy in 1991. Hezbollah adopted infitah as a part 
of its commitment to pragmatism and its willingness to “open up” and become a 
mainstream political party. This was in contrast to the party’s previous position of being 
clandestine. Infitah is a harmonization between Hezbollah’s Islamic identity and its 
Lebanese nationality. It is an expression of the idea that it is possible to resist oppression 
beyond the confines of Lebanon (regional and global dimensions) and be concerned with 
national-patriotic issues (domestic dimension).
58
 Through infitah, Hezbollah is fighting 
for social equality and justice for all across both dimensions.
59
 Hezbollah also adopted 
Lebanonization in 1991 and it refers to a political tactic whereby Hezbollah analyzes the 
prevailing circumstances in Lebanon and constructs its approach within that context, 
making exceptions for Lebanon’s specific circumstances, sympathetic to the country’s 
confessional differences, and its perception of its environment.
60
 Lebanonization refers to 
the recognition or awareness that Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization, composed of 
Lebanese rank and file, its leader is Lebanese, and the Party of God is ultimately 
committed to the welfare of Lebanon. Hezbollah adopted Infitah and Lebanonization 
prior to the 1992 municipal elections in an effort to gain votes, notably from the 
Christian, and Sunni communities. The Party of God “employs the concept infitah or 
Lebanonisation to denote its political discourse, deeds, […] or to signify its enrolment in 
Lebanese domestic political life.”61 
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Hezbollah’s policies of Infitah and Lebanonization are critical in understanding its 
changing normative ideas. Without understanding infitah and Lebanonization, it would be 
difficult to analyze how Hezbollah has reconstructed itself from a clandestine movement 
to a mainstream political party. Hezbollah’s changing normative ideas and norm 
construction can only be explained through the processes of infitah and Lebanonization. 
It is through the realization of infitah and Lebanonization that Hezbollah is able to 
continuously reconstruct itself as a legitimate resistance movement and not a militia. 
Hezbollah’s norms are not constructed in a vacuum. Hezbollah is entrepreneuring 
these norms in a context given to it by history. The social construction of jihad, 
martyrdom, oppressed/oppressor dichotomy, and anti-imperialism are not new ideas, but 
rather have been reconstructed over time. Jihad and martyrdom were constructed as 
integral ideas since the 7
th
 century. Furthermore, they are not ideas exclusive to Islam, but 
are also entrenched in Jewish and Christian tradition. Regarding imperialism, Hezbollah 
is part of a larger continuum of resistance movements from the Middle East and the 
Muslim world who have challenged imperialism. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, 
Nasserism or Arab nationalism, Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN), the Irish 
Republic Army (IRA), the Vietcong, Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
the Kurdish Workers Party (the PKK), and HAMAS are all examples of movements 
across the world who have challenged imperialism either through jihad and martyrdom or 
through conventional warfare. The oppressed/oppressor dichotomy has also been 
constructed throughout history by several movements, including The Civil Rights 
Movement, the Women’s Movements for International Suffrage, South Africa’s African 
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National Congress (ANC), the Red Army Faction, the Tamil Tigers, and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army (FARC).           
 
Project Organization 
 
My project is organized into five chapters. In this introductory chapter I have posed my 
research question, articulated my thesis and reviewed the tenets of my analytical 
framework. In chapter two, I review the extant literature studying Hezbollah according to 
its theoretical foundation. This enables me to identify and address the lacuna in the 
corpus. In chapter three, I examine the ideas that are critical to Hezbollah and the 
normative shifts the Party of God has experienced over the years. More specifically, I 
examine jihad, martyrdom, the dichotomy of the oppressed versus the oppressor, and 
anti-imperialism. For example, I examine Hezbollah’s dedication to jihad not only as a 
method of armed struggle, but also as an inner struggle for the cause of humankind. In 
chapter four, I discuss the physical expression of ideas. I survey Hezbollah’s battle with 
Israel in 2006 and the current Syrian civil war to show that the 2006 war was a form of 
norm contestation, designed to strip the Resistance of its weapons and finally eradicate 
the Party of God. In response to Israel’s construction of Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization bent on murdering all Jews, Hezbollah uses the term terrorist as a rhetorical 
bludgeon to describe Israel. Terrorism or labelling the Other as “terrorist” is an 
expression of power. The idea that both agents accuse the other of terrorism is a form of 
norm contestation that manifested itself in 2006. The fact that Hezbollah is able to accuse 
Elbenhawy 22 
 
Israel of terrorism attests to the party’s political power in Lebanon and in the region. In 
the case of the Syrian war, Hezbollah has constructed the conflict as a battle between the 
resistance bloc, including Al Assad, and the status quo powers. In contradictory fashion, 
Hezbollah’s involvement has only jeopardized Hezbollah’s norm construction and has 
alienated the party from its Sunni allies, such as HAMAS. I conclude by identifying some 
further research trajectories in chapter five.   
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Chapter 2-Literature Review 
The literature on Hezbollah is large and growing. There a number of ways to organize the 
corpus. I have used the theories of neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism to 
categorize the literature. A succinct definition of each theory is given. All sources 
reviewed fall within the confines of neorealism, neoliberalism, or social constructivism. 
None of the literature I reviewed used post-structuralism or Marxism, and consequently, 
they were not one of the theories presented here. Neorealism’s ontology does not 
recognize non-state actors and Hezbollah is a non-state actor, so only one source 
reviewed used neorealism. Neoliberalism is the dominant theory used to analyze 
Hezbollah. The majority of the sources reviewed have adopted a neoliberal approach. 
One of the advantages neoliberalism has over neorealism is that it recognizes non-state 
actors and institutions as significant actors in global politics. In addition, it is broad and 
encompassing and challenges neorealism’s exclusivist analysis of the state and is able to 
produce a wide array of analyses that emphasize an inclusive framework. This allows 
neoliberalism to be dynamic when compared to neorealism and able to identify and 
examine many aspects of global politics, including Hezbollah. Social constructivism also 
recognizes non-state actors, but largely focuses on the (re)construction of ideas, norms, 
and identity; elements that have been ignored in neoliberal analyses of Hezbollah. My 
study of the Party of God fills the lacuna left by neorealists and neoliberals by examining 
Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. Sources are divided based upon themes, including 
ideas, identity and religion, martyrdom operations and jihad. Personal memoirs or 
interviews with Deputy Secretary-General Sayyed Naim Qassem and Secretary-General 
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, a comprehensive analysis of the Shi’a organization, the 
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significance of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom, and Hezbollah’s role in Syria are also 
presented.  
 
Neorealism 
Neorealism is parsimoniously associated with power and the distribution of power. 
Neorealism is a rational choice theory. Rational choice theory is an approach that 
emphasizes how actors seek to maximize their interests and how they choose the most 
effective way to achieve those interests.
62
 Rational choice theorists disregard norms, 
beliefs, values, and identity. In the realist and neorealist sense, power is material and 
tangible. Material power may include tanks and people. Neorealism adopts positivism as 
its principal epistemology. A scientific approach to the study of International Relations, 
positivism posits that knowledge of the social and political “dimensions” may be 
objectively studied and this knowledge may be acquired through empiricism. Those who 
advocate positivism see no difference between social sciences and natural sciences.
63
 
Neorealism’s ontology is individualist and materialist.64 That is, it is the material 
capabilities, such as war, gold, tanks, warships, and military prowess, inter alia, that are 
important in global politics. Thus, neorealism disregards ideas and holistic structures. 
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Realism maintains that it is the individual who desires power due to human nature.
65
 That 
is, states, whether democratic or autocratic, are led by individuals who have an innate 
desire to dominate. Neorealism differs in this sense. Neorealism enjoins that it is not 
human nature that drives policy-makers to seek power, but the structure of the 
international system.
66
 It is not hierarchy, however, that produces war, but anarchy. 
Anarchy is the notion that there is no government or international governing body above 
the level of the state.
67
 As there is no proper disciplinary institution in place to ensure 
peace, states are left to settle disputes through other means, including war. Consequently, 
wars become a reality of global politics. Therefore, states must help themselves and must 
pursue power as a mechanism of survival. Mearsheimer accurately summarizes 
neorealism’s notion of anarchy and power: states “are trapped in an iron cage where they 
have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive.”68 
Survival is the goal of every state and this is ultimately achieved by obtaining as much 
power as possible. Neorealism acknowledges states as the only significant actors of 
consequence in global politics. As a result, the theory is not widely used to study 
Hezbollah.  
The author, Trita Parsi, briefly mentions the skyjacking of TWA Flight 847 and 
goes into further detail about the reaction of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
Iranian’s former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. Parsi also explores the Lebanese-Israeli 
conflict in 2006 and how Iran uses its support for proxies as leverage when negotiating 
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with the United States. Finally, Parsi devotes a paragraph to explaining Hezbollah’s 
attack on U.S Marine barracks in 1983 which killed 241 servicemen.
69
  
Parsi focuses on foreign policy between the states of Israel, Iran, and the United 
States. His text excludes the domestic politics of each state from its analysis. Treacherous 
Alliance is useful because it provides a thorough history of foreign relations between the 
three states. He asserts that the enmity between all three states is not due to Iran 
becoming the first theocratic state in the modern Middle East in 1979, but rather due to a 
“shift in the balance of power in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War and the 
defeat of Iraq in the first Persian Gulf War.”70 The text’s exclusive focus on foreign 
policy, dedicating a section to the “unipolar era,” and use of the balance of power as a 
heuristic device belies its neorealism. Again, the historical relationship between the three 
states proves useful when exploring Iran’s contemporary relationship with the United 
States and Israel. Alas, Parsi fails to capture the importance of Hezbollah in the region. 
The author cannot analyze Iran and Hezbollah as a part of the resistance bloc. Parsi 
cannot recognize Hezbollah’s efforts as a norm entrepreneur because of neorealism’s 
exclusivist focus on state actors. Also, because neorealists do not see the importance of 
norms and non-state actors in global politics which is evident in Parsi’s shallow analysis 
presented on the Party of God. The author’s choice to use neorealism only handicaps the 
author’s ability to adequately examine a non-state actor such as Hezbollah and Iran’s role 
in the so-called treacherous alliance.     
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Neoliberalism 
Like neorealism, neoliberalism is a rational theory in International Relations. 
Neoliberalism emphasizes individualism and freedom as core values. Neoliberalism 
considers states to be unitary and rational. Unitary states are centralized governments 
with central authority. Rational states are states that are motivated by calculating the costs 
and benefits associated with any given decision.
71
 Neoliberalism maintains that 
cooperation is possible because states are rational. In addition to being rational, states 
seek to maximize their absolute gains through the value of cooperation. States are able to 
see the value in cooperation. By extension, states are not concerned about the gains of 
other states. Thus, global politics becomes less competitive. Cooperation is handicapped 
by states who do not wish to cooperate and by cheating states.
72
 Issue-areas that are 
perceived to be beneficial to all states are where cooperation is most likely. For instance, 
the environment and trade are areas of common cooperation. Cooperation is manifested 
in institutions, trade, and complex interdependence. Complex interdependence refers to 
the interconnectedness of the world attributed to world trade and globalization.
73
 States 
being interdependent on one another mitigates against war.
74
 Regarding democracy, 
Immanuel Kant posited the idea of democratization or democratic peace theory, 
suggesting that democratic states share common values and norms, and therefore, are less 
likely to be predisposed to violence or war with other democracies. Dyadic peace theory 
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contends that democracy is inherently more peaceful than autocracy. Therefore, it is 
assumed, if all states are democratic then virtually no wars will occur.
75
 This is because 
democratic leaders are responsible to their constituents and no responsible citizen would 
vote for an unjust war. Neoliberalism is synonymous with fanatical free market 
economics, free trade and deregulation.
76
 It is performed by the Bretton Woods 
institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), the United States, and 
is synonymous with globalization.
77
 Like its counterpart, neorealism and other rational 
choice theories, neoliberalism adopts positivism as its epistemological underpinning. Its 
ontology, like neorealism, is also individualist and materialist, devoid of ideas or social 
structures. The neoliberal project began in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile in 1973 and would 
later be advanced by former Prime Minister of U.K., Margaret Thatcher and former US 
President Ronald Reagan.
78
 In all, neoliberalism is the economic side of liberalism and is 
facilitated by the state. Neoliberalism is the preferred theoretical framework for analysis 
of Hezbollah. 
In Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System the authors 
emphasize cooperation and democratization as common themes. Ehteshami and 
Hinnebusch use Keohane’s and Nye’s complex interdependence to help explain Syria and 
Iran’s foreign policies and the nature of their alliance, especially in Lebanon regarding 
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the historical formation of Hezbollah.
79
 The authors argue that Syria and Iran help to 
counterbalance pro-Western states in the Middle East and US hegemony in the region, 
especially following Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Gulf War. They may have opposing 
interests at times, but the authors consider Syria and Iran “middle powers” who seek to 
dominate the geopolitical order “in the name of defending regional autonomy.”80 
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch’s study on Syria and Iran is pertinent to my study, but it 
struggles to explain Iran and Syria’s historical relationship. The authors cannot explain 
why both states have opposing interests at times while other times they have similar 
interests. Constructivism explains that interests are continuously under construction, and 
consequently, change over time. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch’s emphasis on cooperation 
and complex interdependence falls short of understanding the reconstruction process of 
identity and interests. By not examining the reconstruction of interests, the authors cannot 
explain why interests change.  
     In Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah: The Unholy Alliance and Its War on Lebanon, 
Deeb gives a neoliberal assessment of the adverse effects Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah have 
allegedly had on Lebanon. The text focuses on more recent events, depicting Lebanon as 
a satellite state to the much larger Syria and Iran. Hezbollah’s role is to function as a 
client of both Syria and Iran and serve as a means to maintain influence in Lebanon. The 
author argues that neither Syria nor Hezbollah favoured any peace accord between 
Lebanon and Israel, but rather “delayed the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon” for years.81 
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Furthermore, Deeb repeatedly mentions “freedom” as a common theme throughout the 
book, citing “freedom” for the Cedar Revolution and “freedom and human dignity.”82 
Individualism and freedom are two of the core values of neoliberalism.
83
 The author 
inaccurately describes the premise of the “unholy alliance” as one that is founded on 
religious commonality. Deeb uses the term “unholy” to describe the alliance, highlighting 
the group’s apparent religious unity. Constructivism, however, provides a unique 
explanation of the “unholy” alliance that fills the lacuna left by Deeb. Using 
constructivism, I argue that it is not Shi’ism which unites the “unholy alliance,” but rather 
the norm of resistance. Deeb’s theory of the “unholy” alliance cannot, for example, 
explain why HAMAS is also considered a close ally of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, 
despite HAMAS being the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni social 
and political movement. The author does not recognize the importance of norms in global 
politics, and as a consequence, provides a narrow examination of the so-called unholy 
alliance.  
Similarly, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism by Danial Byman 
attempts to explain the connections between sub-state terrorist groups and their state 
sponsors. His principle research question is: why do states support terrorist groups? 
Byman argues that states fund or aid terror groups out of perceived necessity to preserve 
national security interests. According to Byman, the aim of mobilizing a terrorist group is 
to destabilize a neighbouring country, remove enemy regimes, counter American 
unipolarity, or to achieve other goals.
84
 In addition, it is cheaper to arm and train a 
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terrorist group to wage covert operations against another state, for instance, than to arm 
and train a state’s military forces.85 Byman assigns a chapter to covering the historical 
relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, characterizing their “deadly connection” as 
“strong” in contrast to weak, lukewarm, passive, antagonistic or unwilling.86 He claims 
that Hezbollah is under the tutelage of the Islamic Republic, although in his conclusion 
he does admit that after serving Iran well, Hezbollah has “retained a degree of 
independence from Tehran.”87 Byman discusses the potential adverse effects economic 
sanctions may have on a state that aids terrorists, directly or indirectly. As a rationalist, he 
argues that states calculate the costs and benefits of having sanctions in place. Byman 
suggests states may back down when they see economic losses due to sanctions, such as a 
drop in tourism and that vulnerability (whether the state could “replace the lost trade or 
investment”) would be one of the principle concerns of any state.88 A historical analysis 
of Iran and Hezbollah’s relationship is given which provides useful information regarding 
their alliance, including why Iran has supported Hezbollah in the past and why it 
continues to do so today. Byman’s text does not recognize norms as an important element 
in Iran and Hezbollah’s relationship. The norm of resistance is an important, if not, the 
most important element in their alliance. By not analyzing norms, Byman provides a 
superficial examination of Iranian support for Hezbollah. What unites Iran, Syria, and 
Hezbollah is more than religious commonality and/or “terrorism,” but norms that are 
continuously under construction. This cannot be understood using a neoliberal 
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framework. I fill the lacuna left by Byman, Deeb, Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, among 
others, by analyzing Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. 
     Cordesman’s “Iran’s Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon” seeks to disprove 
that Hezbollah is being fully supported by Iran.
89
 Cordesman, writing during Hezbollah’s 
war with Israel in the summer of 2006, argues that Hezbollah is not entirely reliant on 
Iran or its Revolutionary Guard Corps, but still receives weapon shipments from the 
Islamic Republic, such as short-range and long-range missiles.
90
 Cordesman urges 
American commentators to not make haphazard claims about Iran’s role in the 2006 war 
before seeing any factual evidence.
91
 Cordesman sees Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran as 
rational actors who cooperate within an alliance or a resistance bloc. The author describes 
how Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran had regular meetings, including one with HAMAS’ 
Khaled Mashal shortly before Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers which ultimately 
led to the 2006 war with Israel,
92
 implying that the four had devised a plan to kidnap the 
Israeli soldiers. Actors that are rational and able to cooperate with one another in a world 
of anarchy is one of the principles of neoliberalism.
93
 Indeed, constructivists maintain 
that states are rational actors, but that anarchy is socially constructed. Notably, states and 
state interests are also socially constructed. The value of Cordesman’s work lies in his 
offering a fresh perspective that is uncommon in neoliberal discourse; that is, he does not 
reduce Hezbollah to a proxy of Iran. The notion that Hezbollah is not reducible to Iran is 
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a radical shift in direction, and as a result, uniquely helpful to my study. Cordesman 
explains how Iran supports Hezbollah and argues that both are equal in their relationship. 
However, Cordesman does not explain what unifies Iran and Hezbollah. The lacuna left 
by Cordesman is answered by analyzing the norms, identity, and interests of Iran and 
Hezbollah which are in line with one another. Both construct themselves as anti-Zionist, 
anti-imperial, and resistant to the status quo powers. The author explains the reasons for 
Israel going to war with Hezbollah by providing a tautology of events, including 
Hezbollah’s mission where resistance fighters kidnapped two Israeli soldiers which 
eventually led to the outbreak of the 2006 war. By using constructivism, I am able to 
provide an alternative analysis of the 2006 war by arguing that the war was a contestation 
of norms with the intended goal of dismantling Hezbollah and stripping it of its weapons 
supply.  
Similarly, background on Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria is explored in 
“Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship.” A neoliberal work, El-
Hokayem gives a historical review of the relationship between the two parties, beginning 
with Hafez Al Assad’s time in office to Bashar Al Assad’s tenure as president. El-
Hokayem states that Hezbollah is still viewed by many analysts such as Deeb as a 
“proxy” or “client” of Iran and Syria. El-Hokayem holds that the Shi’a revival as a 
political entity in the Lebanese polity and across the Middle East, and Hezbollah’s 
military victory over Israel in 2006 has provided the Shi’a movement with autonomy by 
expanding its support base throughout Lebanon.
94
 In fact, the author goes as far as to 
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assert that claiming Hezbollah to be a client of either state is an “obsolete” practice.95 El-
Hokayem explains that it is not Hezbollah that is dependent upon Syria, but rather the 
opposite.
96
 Nevertheless, Hezbollah and Syria have historically been a part of an alliance 
against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and later the Shebaa 
Farms. According to El-Hokayem, Hezbollah and Syria have become dependent upon 
one another and this was illustrated in 2006 when Hezbollah defended itself against 
Israeli aggression with the help of Syrian support.
97
  In exchange, Syria was seeking to 
regain its position in the region and give Al Assad’s government a “new lease on life.”98 
The author explains how peace and cooperation may be realized by having common 
objectives or preferences causing both parties, Syria and Hezbollah, to be interdependent 
upon one another, despite anarchy. The article was selected as it provides an insightful 
look into Hezbollah’s historical relationship with the Assad government constructed 
throughout the years. The article was written prior to the current Syrian conflict, but it is 
important to understand the historical relationship that draws these two allies together. 
Once clear, one begins to see Hezbollah’s involvement in the current Syrian crisis as 
more of a desperate measure in rescuing the resistance alliance, than a conflict for 
religious supremacy. El-Hokayem states that identity is important in global politics, but 
does not expound upon it.
99
 The author avers that Bashar Al Assad relied on Nasrallah to 
help cultivate his identity as a capable leader. Al Assad did so in order to challenge 
presumptions that he was too young to lead Syria. However, the author does not explain 
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why Al Assad has continued to be an ally of Hezbollah and Iran. I fill the lacuna left by 
El-Hokayem by using social constructivism. By using constructivist analysis, I explain 
the nature of Syria’s relationship with Iran and Hezbollah by examining the role of norms 
in the resistance bloc.  
     Voice of Hezbollah: the Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is comprised 
of speeches and interviews from the mid-1980s to 2007 conducted mostly with the 
Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. The interviews were partly 
conducted in English and Arabic. In addition, sources used were translated from Arabic 
to English. The book shares the views of the leader of Hezbollah on several topics 
ranging from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the “War on Terror,” to Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions.
100
 The Voice of Hezbollah is more than a mundane autobiography of the 
Secretary-General. It is one of the few dependable sources available in English to 
“compare and/or criticize the ideas expressed directly by Hezbollah’s leader.”101 Features 
of neoliberalism often emphasized by Nasrallah in the text include freedoms, capital, and 
economics.
102
 Moreover, the concept of cooperation is a common theme throughout the 
book. Nasrallah discusses cooperation as a favourable alternative to conflict concerning 
the several factions in the Lebanese government. Neoliberalism sees peaceful coexistence 
as a possible solution to anarchy mainly through institutions and complex 
interdependence.
103
 The text uses complex interdependence to explain Hezbollah’s 
position on cooperation in the Lebanese government, but fails to adequately explain that 
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it is identity that has created a schism in the government, namely between the March 8 
Alliance and the Cedar Revolution. The Cedar Revolution has historically mistrusted 
Hezbollah and its allies, claiming that the pan-Shi’a party is a client of Iran. Hezbollah’s 
implementation of Lebanonization has done little to change this perception, especially 
following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri.  
Similar to Nasrallah, Hizbullah: The Story from Within provides its readers with 
an intimate account of the dynamics of Hezbollah in a thematic sequence ranging from 
the group’s goals and vision to essential milestones in the group’s history, the Palestinian 
cause, regional and global politics with Iran and Syria, and lastly the future of Hezbollah 
as a non-state actor. A neoliberal text, Qassem reaffirms the importance of Islamism to 
the pan-Shi’a movement and argues that occupation of land is sinful, and therefore, must 
be resisted.
104
 Moreover, the author praises Iran for its unrelenting support by stating 
“upon its foundation, Hizbullah saw a possibility for achieving its goals and aspirations 
through the backing and reinforcement expressed by Iran.”105 Qassem provides a 
neoliberal perspective of Hezbollah. This is in contrast to my analysis of Hezbollah, 
which allows me to study the movement as a norm entrepreneur, including its ideas, 
norms, and physical resistance. Qassem does not examine the importance of norms in 
global politics or Hezbollah’s norm entrepreneurship. Hizbullah: The Story from Within 
was chosen in preference to other works, because it offers a fresh perspective from one of 
the leading members of the movement.  
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Norton is known for his seminal book, Hezbollah: A Short History. This text is an 
encompassing neoliberal analysis of Hezbollah, ranging from its early beginnings to its 
war with Israel in 2006. The author’s aim is to provide a more “balanced and nuanced 
account” of Hezbollah.106 Norton posits that Hezbollah and other Lebanese movements 
may have participated in lethal violence against the Israeli Defense Forces, but were 
within their legal limits to do so, as long as Israeli forces occupied swathes of southern 
Lebanon.
107
 Norton argues that the movement’s ideas have become contradictory. That is, 
there is clash between Hezbollah’s religiosity and pragmatism. However, in my study I 
argue that Hezbollah’s ideas do not clash, but are congruent. Similar to identity 
construction, constructivism holds that ideas are continuously being (re)constructed. 
Thus, ideational changes can be explained from a constructivist perspective as dynamic 
shifts that have been (re)constructed in an effort to adapt and pragmatize. Indeed, this is 
what Hezbollah does.  
A neoliberal text exploring Al-Manar TV, “Aiming at Liberation: Al-Manar 
Media Campaigns against the Israeli Occupation of Southern Lebanon (1998–2000)”  
argues “that Hezbollah decided to use the media systematically, as one of the tools to 
achieve the liberation of southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation” realized in May 
2000.
108
 For example, propaganda, including infomercials and messages, such as “‘why 
wait until June to leave Lebanon,’”109 were promulgated and employed as means to 
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demoralize Israeli soldiers stationed in south Lebanon. The messages resonated loudly 
and were able to reach viewers as far as Haifa, Israel. Harb examines the role of Al-
Manar TV in Lebanon from 1996 until 2000. Harb provides a chronicle of events leading 
up to May 2000, citing Al-Manar’s role in psychological warfare. However, the author is 
unable to analyze Al-Manar TV as an organizational platform for the party’s norm 
lifecycle. The author explains how the transmission of ideas are imperative to the overall 
success of Hezbollah. Having an organizational platform such as a TV network is an 
indispensable tool to any norm entrepreneur. I use Harb’s insights to explore Hezbollah’s 
campaign of psychological warfare.        
     Bringing matters into the contemporary moment, Sullivan analyzes 
Hezbollah’s military engagement in the Syrian conflict using a neoliberal framework. 
“Hezbollah in Syria” provides detailed information about the role of Hezbollah, Iran, and 
Iraqi militias in Syria’s civil war. Major offensives led by Hezbollah, in conjunction with 
the Syrian army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps against opposition forces, 
are featured. The author concludes that the ‘Axis of Resistance” has actually benefited, at 
least militarily, from fighting side-by-side. Equally important, the article illustrates how 
Hezbollah has impacted the outcome of the war and tipped the balance back in the favour 
of Al Assad after he seemingly lost his grip on power. Iran and Hezbollah contributed to 
the war effort by training Syrian troops and paramilitary groups supporting Al Assad, 
through reconnaissance missions in Al Qusayr, Al Qalamoun Mountains, Halab,
110
 
Homs, Hama, and Damascus.
111
 Indeed, the Syrian conflict has proved to be the litmus 
test for Syria and its allies and the outcome, according to Sullivan, has favoured 
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Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. The conflict has strengthened them. For example, the conflict 
has provided the opportunity for Iranian and Hezbollah fighters to gain valuable 
experience on the battlefield and allowed others, namely the Shias of Iraq, to join in the 
fight in Syria.
112
 Again, cooperation is the common theme in “Hezbollah in Syria.” In 
fact, Sullivan argues that cooperation was and remains critical for Al Assad government 
to remain in power. Also, Sullivan discusses the relationship between Hezbollah and 
Syria and how strong it is.
113
 Despite the presence of anarchy, cooperation is feasible. 
This particular conceptualization of cooperation is one of the core principles of 
neoliberalism.
114
 Hezbollah is not authoring the norm of resistance alone, but, 
unsurprisingly, in conjunction with state agents such as Syria and Iran. 
In sum, neorealism views states as paramount, excluding the role of non-state 
actors in global politics. As a result, little has been written on Hezbollah from a neorealist 
perspective. Indeed, the majority of the literature already written on Hezbollah is 
theoretically neoliberal, leaving a lacuna to be filled. I fill this lacuna by analyzing 
Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East. In contrast to neorealism and 
neoliberalism’s individual ontology, social constructivism is based in a social ontology 
and emphasizes the role of norm construction in global politics. This allows for a unique 
and valuable addition to the corpus of literature already produced on Hezbollah.   
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Constructivism 
Constructivists are concerned “with the centrality of ideas and human consciousness,” 
while emphasizing “a holistic and idealist view of structures.”115 Idealism holds that ideas 
are important in international politics. Structures, according to social constructivists, are 
social and not entirely material.
116
 Constructivists are concerned about whether or not the 
structure is what constructs the agent’s ideas, interests, norms, and identity or if agents 
are born with predetermined identities and norms. This suggests that agents are pre-
social. This is known as the agent-structure problem.
117
 In contrast to individualist and 
materialist ontology (neorealism and neoliberalism), constructivism subscribes to a social 
ontology. Constructivists recognize materialism as a part of their ontology and enjoin that 
the world is composed of materialist and social structures. That is, the material world can 
only be understood through intersubjective meanings.
118
 As social beings, agents (states 
or individuals) cannot be detached from a world of normative meaning that constructs 
who they are and the possibilities open to them.
119
 Identity and interests also cannot be 
detached from a world of social meaning. Thus, identities shape interests. Interests are 
socially constructed and therefore change over time.
120
  
Constructivists adopt an intersubjective understanding of state relations, 
emphasizing ideas, social agents, structures, norms, and the mutual constitution of 
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identity.
 121
 It refers to social interactions among states which are constantly under 
construction. For example, cooperation and enmity between states is not given, but 
constructed through intersubjective meanings and interactions.  
Norms and the roles they play in global politics as social constructs are also an 
important element in constructivism. Constructivism’s epistemology is post-positivist.122 
A response to positivism, post-positivism is a methodology which rejects the application 
of the natural sciences to the social sciences. Post-positivist methodology rests on the 
idea that people “conceive, construct, and constitute the worlds in which they live, 
including the international world, which is an entirely human arrangement and nothing 
else.”123  
Hezbollah’s norm of resistance has been reconstructed over time. This reflects the 
dynamic political landscape of Lebanon. Joseph Alagha discusses these changes in great 
detail. While other works recognize that Hezbollah is a pragmatic political and social 
movement, Alagha differs because he analyzes diachronically the group’s fundamental 
ideas. In his dissertation, The Shifts in Hezbollah’s Ideology: Religious ideology, Political 
Ideology, and Political Program Alagha examines Hezbollah’s political and religious 
ideology and divides Hezbollah’s ideological and political shifts into three stages: 1) 
1978-1984/5,  2) 1984/5-1990, and 3) 1991-2005 respectively.
124
 Jihad, martyrdom, the 
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oppressed/oppressor dichotomy, anti-imperialism, and relations with the West and 
Europe are explored as ideas and practices.
125
 Alagha enjoins that the movement has 
favoured a pragmatic political program, especially after the 1992 parliamentary elections 
in response to Hezbollah’s ever-changing environment. Alagha’s dissertation enhances 
my study of Hezbollah by providing fresh constructivist insights into the party’s identity 
and ideological shifts.
126
 Plenty of studies on the Party of God provide an analysis of the 
ideas and practices of Hezbollah, but do not do so diachronically. The ideas Hezbollah 
constructs have changed.  
  Another text by Alagha, “Israeli-Hizbullah 34-Day War: Causes and 
Consequences,” explores the reality of indiscriminate warfare, including Israeli use of 
weapons such as white phosphorus and cluster bombs.
127
 The author’s thesis is that 
Hezbollah’s resistance has shifted and is no longer directed at Israel, but after 2006, has 
become “Lebanonized” or internalized and more recently, has focused on the Syrian 
crisis. Alagha lucidly explains the recent changes in Hezbollah’s norm of resistance.  
Alagha also examines the political schism that occurred following Hezbollah’s “Divine 
Victory” in the 2006 war with Israel. The schism was the consequence of Hezbollah’s 
demand that “a national unity Cabinet be formed, where the party and its Christian allies, 
the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), wield the one-third veto power.”128 In a deliberate 
attempt to control the national political sphere, Hezbollah and its allies sought to exercise 
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power over the legislature and the presidency.
129
 According to Alagha, the demand for a 
one-third veto crystallized out of Hezbollah’s surge in popularity following Israel’s 
failure to disarm and dismantle the group. The 2006 war with Israel signified a shift in 
Hezbollah’s construction of resistance, from being regional to domestic. I deploy Alagha 
to make the point that Hezbollah’s resistance shifts according to its political environment. 
Alagha’s analysis of the 34 day war complements my study on Hezbollah’s material 
resistance and illustrates how ideas of jihad and martyrdom are realized in war.  
Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion by Amal Saad-Ghorayeb is an indispensable 
account of the ideology of Hezbollah, often referenced by other texts. Saad-Ghorayeb 
explores inner and outer jihad as a concept which helps to provide discipline to 
Hezbollah, the relationship Iran and Syria have with the group, and what it means to be 
anti-Zionist. Most other books have similar reviews of the Shi’a movement, but Saad-
Ghorayeb goes further and explains the dichotomy of oppressor versus the oppressed as 
one of the central elements of Hezbollah’s ideology. It is the notion that the oppressed 
must rebel, regardless of their religion, race, or creed to challenge the oppressors. The 
oppressors are often described as the United States and Israel. An example of oppression 
is the perception of the Zionist project which is Israel’s goal of occupying swathes of 
land encompassing the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq.
130
 America’s role in the 
project is that it seeks to subordinate the Middle East to its economic demands, usurping 
the wealth of the Middle East, and stimulating instability in the region.
131
 Saad-
Ghorayeb’s principle objective is to “examine the central pillars of Hizbu’llah’s 
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intellectual structure within the framework of Lebanese socio-political reality.”132 Saad-
Ghorayeb does not emphasize history as much as Hezbollah’s ideas that are continuously 
under construction. Furthermore, the author examines Hezbollah’s “clash” in identity, 
politically with “its Islamic principles” and how they contradict.133 Of course, identity 
matters too.  
Hamzeh’s In the Path of Hezbollah focuses heavily on the emergence, ideology, 
organizational structure, and modes of action, and their implications for Lebanon and the 
wider region.”134 Organizational structure refers to the hierarchy of Hezbollah. The 
modes of action include militant (armed struggle) and the gradualist-pragmatic mode 
(participating in politics and gaining more seats in the legislature) which Hamzeh argues 
are not contradictory.
135
 The author goes into detail about the concept of jihad, 
martyrdom operations, and the organizational structure of resistance. According to 
Hamzeh, the book offers a mosaic of theories, including crisis conditions, revolutions, 
leadership, personality, social class, and political parties.
136
 However, these are not 
recognized “theories” in International Relations. Hamzeh’s analysis of Shi’a identity, 
Shia “identity crisis,” and ideology are reflective of constructivism.137 Similarly to Saad-
Ghorayeb’s Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion, Hamzeh investigates issues that are at the 
core of my study, including how ideas matter and how they are implemented. For 
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instance, Hamzeh examines the juristical ideology of Hezbollah and how it has 
transformed itself, ideologically, from militancy to pragmatism.
138
 
 
Conclusion 
My study analyzes Hezbollah in terms of the construction of global politics. Using the 
notion of norm entrepreneurship developed by Finnemore and Sikkink, I fill the lacuna 
left by other texts by examining Hezbollah from a constructivist standpoint. This is a 
valuable addition to the literature already produced on the Party of God for several 
reasons. First, I demonstrate the importance of constructed ideas and how ideas are 
ultimately performed. Second, I illustrate that the meaning of resistance and what it 
means to “resist” are not given, but constructed. Equally important, by using social 
constructivism as my theoretical lens, I help the literature examine Hezbollah in a 
fundamentally different way; that the norm of resistance is continuously under 
construction, shifting and projecting new ways to resist. Third, I explain how ideas 
change over time. Prior to 2006, the norm of resistance was directed entirely towards 
Israel and the United States, but as I argue this is no longer the case. Due to the wars in 
Syria and Yemen, Hezbollah has constructed new enemies, such as the GCC states, and 
Sunni extremism. By seeing Hezbollah in this light, I argue that Hezbollah is creating a 
pragmatic version of resistance that is serving its interests, nationally, regionally, and 
internationally, effectively transforming its identity, transforming even the label of a 
resistance movement to a successful political party.  
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Chapter 3-Hezbollah’s Changing Normative Ideas 
Finnemore and Sikkink state that in order for a norm entrepreneur to be successful an 
organizational platform is required.
139
 It is the necessary infrastructure required by a 
norm entrepreneur and is used as a launching pad in stage one of norm construction, 
known as norm emergence. Without an organizational platform to promote or propagate 
the emerging norm, the chance of the new norm reaching the “tipping point” decreases 
significantly and it is unlikely to reach stage two of norm construction, known as norm 
cascade. Accordingly, it is impossible to promote a new norm without a platform from 
which to advocate. Ideas must be objectified through an organizational platform. Through 
Al-Manar TV (literally means the Lighthouse), Hezbollah engaged in psychological 
warfare. Psychological warfare refers to messages that are delivered through violent and 
nonviolent methods. It was an alternative method of war in its fight for liberation from 
Israeli occupation. As Al Jammal asserts, Israel has attempted and continues today to 
portray Hezbollah as terrorists and thugs. He emphasizes the importance of changing 
terminology from terrorist to fighter, for example, and for the world to be presented with 
a more balanced representation of the party. This was only possible through an 
organizational platform, such as Al-Manar TV.
140
 It is important to stress that norm 
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entrepreneurship is reserved for those in positions of power. Not all norm entrepreneurs 
possess or have access to an organizational platform. Consequently, certain norms do not 
reach the “tipping point.” Having access to an organizational platform is an expression of 
power. Hezbollah’s norm entrepreneurship attests to its empowerment as being part of 
the Lebanese established order.   
As a norm entrepreneur, Hezbollah has continued to construct and reconstruct the 
norm of resistance through the use of its ideas. These ideas have been the ideological 
pillars of the movement since its inception and remain integral to Hezbollah. These ideas 
are jihad, martyrdom, the oppressed/oppressor dichotomy, and anti-imperialism. The 
ideological foundation of Hezbollah has also shifted throughout its history in response to 
Hezbollah’s environment. To adapt, Hezbollah had to alter the ideas mentioned above 
that were developed and introduced during the late 1970s and mid-1980s when the 
movement was still clandestine. This chapter explains Hezbollah’s ideological pillars and 
illustrates how these normative ideas of resistance have been reconstructed over time. I 
argue that as part of its commitment to infitah, Lebanonization, and pragmatism, 
Hezbollah has had little choice but to adapt in order to survive the political climate in 
Lebanon and remain armed. Remaining an armed movement is Hezbollah’s raison d’etre 
if it wishes to continue constructing the norm of resistance. Even if the weapons remain 
unused, the perception of having weaponry serves to further enhance the legitimacy of 
Hezbollah as a symbol of resistance in the region, even if some doubt the legitimacy of 
the claim. 
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Jihad 
Violence and Islamic extremism are commonly misunderstood to be exclusively 
associated with jihad. However, jihad, originating from the Arabic verb jahada, means to 
struggle, exert, strive, or endeavor.
141
 This does not necessarily refer to violence, but 
rather to struggle in the way of God. Jihad is a dedication to one’s religiosity, either 
through intention or action.
142
 The struggle may refer to any activity, be it internal or 
external. According to Hezbollah, any action that exercises effort in God’s cause is 
jihad.
143
 Furthermore, according to an Islamic scholar, the use of jihad in the Quran and 
Hadith is enjoined for believers to struggle with their possessions and selves in the way 
of God.
144
 This struggle is not necessarily for God, but in the cause of mankind. 
Consequently, God’s cause is the “cause of the people, the oppressed, the cause of pride, 
honour and glory, the cause of the defense of the land, the cause of the defense of the 
sacred, of religion and of the values of humanity’.”145 In Hezbollah’s religious doctrine, 
jihad is defensive rather than offensive.
146
 Defensive jihad is categorized by military and 
non-military jihad. Military refers to jihad by the hand or battling the enemy on the 
battlefield. Non-military jihad refers to persuasive jihad. Persuasive jihad is jihad 
practiced by the tongue and heart.
147
 Jihad of the tongue is “supporting the right and 
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correcting the wrong.”148 Jihad of the heart is combating the devil and worldly 
temptations.
149
 Hezbollah is not religiously sanctioned to launch a preemptive attack on 
its enemy (offensive jihad), reserving only the right to self-defense (defensive jihad). 
Moreover, defensive jihad does not necessarily refer to martyrdom. For instance, 
Hezbollah’s former Secretary-General Abbas Al-Mussawi was assassinated, along with 
his wife and son by Israeli fire in 1991 and was consequently honoured as a martyr even 
though he did not participate in military jihad.
150
 Chapter 9 of the Quran titled Al-Tawba 
helps to construct jihad’s importance in Islam and those who devote themselves to the 
cause (9:29): “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not 
consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not 
adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture - [fight] until they 
give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.”151 Imam Ali Ibn Abu Taleb stated 
“‘jihad is one of the doors of heaven, God opened it for his special saints. Jihad is the 
garment of the pious; it is God’s shield and his assured Heaven’.”152 It is incumbent on 
all Muslims, young or old, healthy or ill to engage in jihad.
153
 Quotations from the Holy 
Quran, and statements from Imam Ali, help to (re)construct the idea of jihad as a struggle 
that every Muslim must endure. Hezbollah constructs jihad as a struggle for God and not 
Hezbollah. However, through Hezbollah one is able to serve his religion by striving for 
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the sake and cause of God by fulfilling his duties of jihad. This is as an important starting 
point for Hezbollah.  
Hezbollah has adopted a broader definition of jihad categorizing what Hamzeh 
labels major modes and submodes of jihad. Hezbollah has categorized the major modes 
of jihad as Greater Jihad (al Jihad al-Akbar) and Lesser Jihad (al Jihad al-Asghar). 
Greater Jihad refers to the inner struggle one faces throughout his or her lifetime. 
Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem explains Greater Jihad as: 
‘“placing one’s powers and faculties under the yoke of Allah’s commands and purging 
the domain of one’s body of satanic elements and their forces’.”154 Nasrallah emphasizes 
that the ‘“battle with oneself is more dangerous than the battle with the external enemy. 
Thus our struggle against ourselves must be stronger than our struggle with our 
enemy’.”155 Notably, Greater Jihad is not a struggle that ends expeditiously, but rather 
according to Hamzeh is an everlasting struggle.
156
 Further, Greater Jihad prepares the 
believer for Lesser Jihad, that is, the armed or physical struggle. Following some battles, 
the Prophet Muhammed avers: “‘We returned from the smaller jihad (al jihad al-asghar) 
and we still have [to conduct] the greater jihad (al jihad al-akbar)’.”157 The Prophet 
explained greater jihad as the “‘the struggle with the self (jihad al-nafs) [jihad of the 
self]’.”158  
Lesser Jihad or (al Jihad al-Asghar) refers to fighting the non-believers, or in the 
case of Hezbollah, the imperialists and the oppressors. Lesser Jihad is divided into two 
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submodes: Elementary (Offensive) and Defensive Jihad. Defensive Jihad is further 
divided into armed and unarmed Jihad. Only the Prophet or one of the Twelve Imams
159
 
may authorize elementary jihad, also known as “holy war” or “offensive war” according 
to Hezbollah’s ideology.160 It is global in scale and is intended to spread Islam across the 
world. Despite the presence of the faqih Ali Khamenei, elementary jihad cannot be 
authorized. Accordingly, Qassem summarily concluded that the conditions warranted for 
offensive jihad are clearly not available, and therefore, non-existential.
161
 The conditions 
are unavailable because there is no living Prophet or Imam who can authorize elementary 
jihad. 
Defensive Jihad (al Jihad al-Difa’i) espouses defense as an essential mechanism 
for resisting aggression from opponents of Islam who wish to harm the umma. Defensive 
jihad, some argue, also includes defending the Muslim umma’s right to freely proselytize 
the message of Islam. The umma is the symbolic representation of the total Muslim 
population of the world. The umma transcends borders, ethnicities, and races. Many 
Islamists hope for the umma to be a unitary political entity, ruled by a caliphate. Anarchy 
being socially constructed and an integral element of global politics, Hezbollah considers 
Defensive Jihad as the only means of defending the umma from unwarranted attacks. 
This is also an attempt to internalize the norm of resistance. Notably, Hezbollah’s cadres 
do not need the authorization of an infallible Imam to engage in Defensive Jihad in 
contrast to Elementary Jihad. Permission to engage in Defensive Jihad is granted by the 
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waliyat al-faqih, the Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei.
162
 According to Shi’a 
tradition, defensive military jihad is a religious obligation in the following three 
circumstances: 
1.) If the opponents of Islam attacked any of the Muslim countries to achieve imperial 
ambitions, then permission is granted or if Muslims are driven from their homes unjustly 
merely for their saying: “‘Our Lord is Allah’… ” (22: 39-40). 
2.) If there is an attack on the public purse of Muslims and the national assets of the 
Muslim countries.  
3.) Defending the downtrodden or the oppressed (mustad’afin) who do not have the 
ability to defend themselves against the injustices and hostility perpetrated by the 
oppressors (mustakbirin)
163
 
Historically, Hezbollah has symbolically used the martyrdom of Imam Hussein 
Ibn Ali and the reenactment of the Karbala Drama as a reminder of oppression and to use 
jihad in defense of the umma. The Karbala Drama refers to the martyrdom of Imam 
Hussein Ibn Ali by the forces of Yazid, Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. Imam Hussein’s 
martyrdom in an effort to uproot despotism from the umma is used by Hezbollah as a 
metaphor to construct the ideas of jihad, martyrdom, and oppression. That is, by invoking 
the Karbala Drama, Hezbollah is constructing religious motifs and symbolism to provide 
legitimacy to its norm construction. Hezbollah’s Defensive Jihad is rooted in the party’s 
hostility towards Israel and its occupation of South Lebanon. Hezbollah is reconstructing 
its identity by historically engaging in jihad against Israel and by declaring its 
unwavering support for a sovereign Palestine. In doing so, Hezbollah is constructing the 
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norm of resistance, resistance to occupation and Zionism. In a form of norm contestation, 
Israel constructs Iran and its allies, including Hezbollah, as the greatest threat to “world 
peace,” citing Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a palpable threat. Hezbollah also constructs 
Zionism as the principal threat to the Middle East and to the umma. Indeed, we live in a 
social world constructed by intersubjective meanings. Without interaction, Hezbollah and 
Israel would be incapable of being in a contestation of norms or unable to construct 
identities for the Other. Despite the terrorist label often exploited as a rhetorical 
bludgeon, Norton argues that so long as Israel occupied swathes of Lebanese land 
Hezbollah and other Lebanese factions were completely within their legal rights to resist 
Israeli occupation and to do so with lethal violence.
164
 Israel eventually withdrew in May 
2000. From Hezbollah’s perspective, it was jihad and the valiancy of the mujahdin that 
expelled Israel from the security zone and not land-for-peace deals.
165
 Sayyid Nasrallah 
enjoins: “‘We want to make peace for our umma with our blood, rifles, and severed limbs 
… This is the peace we believe in’.”166 The party’s hostility towards Zionism and 
occupation illustrates the movement’s commitment to jihad, not only as a military 
struggle, but also an ideological one, grounded in fighting imperialism and oppression. 
Defensive Jihad may also be nonviolent. Sayyid Nasrallah explains the difference 
between armed and unarmed struggle: “‘An armed struggle means fighting the enemy 
with blood and involves martyrdom. An unarmed struggle involves political, economic, 
and cultural means’.”167 In reference to his party’s policy of Lebanonization, Nasrallah 
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goes on to state: “‘Our defensive jihad in Lebanon involves both’,”168 armed and 
unarmed jihad. The decision of whether to participate in armed or unarmed Defensive 
Jihad is left up to circumstances and is often left to the discretion of each individual. In 
line with its commitment to infitah, Hezbollah has vowed not to turn its guns on fellow 
compatriots, but instead engage in unarmed struggle that involves “conquer[ing] the state 
from the bottom up.”169 This means striving politically and economically, lobbying 
government, participating in elections, and joining a multi-confessional cabinet.
170
   
Nasrallah’s position is that to reach Lesser Jihad one must first reach the level of 
felicity in Greater Jihad because the struggle with oneself is greater than the enemy. 
Once Greater Jihad is achieved, then one may proceed and strive for Lesser Jihad. 
Hezbollah constructs Greater Jihad to be more challenging than Lesser Jihad. Therefore, 
the success of Lesser Jihad is dependent upon the success of Greater Jihad. According to 
Saad-Ghorayeb, this is primarily due to man’s worldly desires and temptations and the 
difficulties in trying to battle or overcome such desires.
171
 Notably, Hezbollah did not 
always engage in Lesser Jihad. In Hezbollah’s early years, party cadres were required to 
devote themselves to Greater Jihad. The intention was to spiritually improve and reform 
the inner-self into a faithful confluent human-being.
172
 Once Greater Jihad was achieved, 
members could then engage the enemy using Lesser Jihad. Hezbollah understood that to 
defeat Israel militarily through Lesser Jihad, one had to defeat his greatest foe, himself. 
“Accordingly, the raison d’être of the Greater Jihad is the Lesser Jihad, for the 
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performance of the former necessarily entails a willingness to fulfil the latter.”173 
Therefore, Lesser Jihad is contingent upon Greater Jihad, and as a result, only regarded 
as greater in that sense. In a nutshell, Hezbollah prides itself as the defender of Arab 
lands and the downtrodden. This remains an integral element of its identity and norm 
construction. Jihad is only one of the essential ways Hezbollah constructs the norm of 
resistance, but one of the most important ideas constructed by the movement. Defensive 
Jihad is required of every Muslim and is “one of the eight ‘Ibadat (ritual practices) of 
Shi’ite Islam. This religious observance is grounded not only in the logic of self-
preservation, but also a function of the Shi’ites’ historical preoccupation with the 
rejection of injustice and humiliation.”174 The idea of oppression, suffering, and 
humiliation has long been part of the Shi’a psyche. The significance given to Defensive 
Jihad in the religio-political thought of Hezbollah and in Shi’ism is generally not relevant 
in Sunni Islam, which places equal importance on all Islamic requirements.
175
 In fact, 
preserving the umma from external danger by engaging in Defensive Jihad is constructed 
by Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and Hezbollah to be more important than praying or 
fasting. Concomitantly, those who fail to engage in any type of jihad will live in shame, 
eventually giving in to his or her enemies’ demands, losing his or her religiosity which 
strengthens the self and weakens the enemy.
176
  
Hezbollah’s jihad has indeed changed over time, especially following May 2000. 
As the numbers suggest, the party’s engagement in defensive military jihad witnessed a 
dramatic drop in 2001, when compared to years 1996 to 2000. The party reached a peak 
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of 4,928 operations for 1996-2000, but dwindled to 16 operations by 2001-2. The 
unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon explains the party’s change in 
defensive military jihad. Following Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, the 
party began shifting its focus from resistance to the Lebanese political sphere. This is an 
exceptional transformation for the movement. Hezbollah had been engaging in Defensive 
Jihad from the late 1980s until 2001. The reconstruction of jihad is not coincidental, but 
is a pragmatic shift from the physical expression of resistance to achieving national 
political goals by conquering the state from the bottom up. This includes participating in 
the Lebanese political system through non-violent means. Up until 2005, Hezbollah could 
not fully engage in domestic affairs, such as participating in parliamentary elections, 
reforming the confessional political system that has been in place since 1990, or 
eradicating corruption that has been plaguing Lebanon for years.
177
  
In 2006, the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and Israel’s readiness to seek any 
pretext to extirpate the pan-Shi’a movement from the Middle East subsequently resulted 
in a war that would span 34 days. Hezbollah shifted once again in 2006 to armed Lesser 
Jihad to resist Israeli bellicosity. Immediately following Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s 
sponsored Seven Point truce with Israel, Hezbollah began to embark on a political 
campaign, exploiting what the movement called Divine Victory (Nasrallah) in the 2006 
war with Israel. The Seven Point Truce was Siniora’s attempt to find a political solution 
to the war in 2006. The choice of words, such as divine, helps to galvanize feelings of 
religious zeal designed to construct Hezbollah as inspired and protected by God. This 
provides legitimacy to Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. In order for resistance to be 
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constructed, it must be legitimized. By invoking religious fervor, Hezbollah is 
reconstructing the norms of a pan-Shi’a movement which is resisting oppression and 
imperialism using jihad and martyrdom. After all, material resistance must be justifiable. 
In Lebanon, the state and Hezbollah reserve the right to use force when deemed 
necessary. The use of force is legitimatized through Hezbollah’s construction of the norm 
of resistance and religiosity. It is also legitimized by the movement’s willingness to 
actively participate in elections.  
 Hezbollah engaged in unarmed Lesser Jihad from 2006 until 2010, demanding to 
have a greater role in government. This entailed an internal political battle with the 
Siniora government over Hezbollah’s demands to establish a multi-confessional cabinet 
that would include members of Hezbollah which the Siniora government argued ran 
contrary to the Taif agreement. The goal was for the government to ultimately collapse or 
give in to Hezbollah’s demands.178 A part of its policy of infitah and Lebanonization, 
Hezbollah sought to reconstruct its identity from pan-Islamism to Lebanon’s most 
powerful political force. Against this backdrop, the movement’s national identity took 
precedence over pan-Islamism.
179
 In order to appeal to a larger constituency than the 
South, Hezbollah was required to become more open in an effort not to alienate the Sunni 
and Christian communities. To do so, its construction of pan-Islamism was quieted, but 
not completely abandoned. In 2008, tension between Hezbollah and the central 
government was aggravated when Siniora announced that he intended to shut down the 
group’s private telecommunication network which serves Hezbollah as an organizational 
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platform. This caused Hezbollah to employ armed jihad, resulting in a temporary 
takeover of West Beirut by followers. Clashes ensued between government supporters 
and Hezbollah members, resulting in the death of 100 people from both sides.
180
 Conflict 
would not subside until Hezbollah’s demands were fully met. Hezbollah reformed the 
constitution by transforming the government make-up into a multi-confessional cabinet; 
holding more than one-third of cabinet seats, Hezbollah could now effectively overthrow 
an unfriendly administration.
181
 Hezbollah’s resistance shifted from being external to 
internal. Hezbollah resisted the social structure of Israeli occupation and began resisting 
the dominant confessional system that has been in place since the end of the civil war. 
This shift is reflective of Hezbollah’s pledge to Lebanonization. The Party of God was 
able to shift its norm of resistance from external to internal following Israel’s withdrawal 
in 2000. Once Israel withdrew from Lebanon, Hezbollah refocused its efforts on 
becoming a powerful political force in Lebanon. Hezbollah managed to convince 
supporters of its shift in its norm of resistance by constructing the Shias as being 
underrepresented in government. Prior to Hezbollah’s first electoral win in 1992, Subhi 
Al Tufayli, Hezbollah’s first Secretary-General, was the first to object (and continues to 
object) participating in any elections, contending that Hezbollah would be ‘“selling out’” 
if it participated in the Lebanese political polity.
182
 In addition, by engaging in the 
political process, Al Tufayli warned, Hezbollah would be transformed from a 
revolutionary movement to a party that is politically tamed.
183
 Al Tufayli resigned in 
protest in 1991. Hezbollah was, and remains, armed. By reserving a spot in the 
                                                          
180 Blanford (b), 1. 
181
 Alagha (b), 8. 
182
 Norton, 100. 
183
 Norton, 100. 
Elbenhawy 59 
 
government’s cabinet, Hezbollah is ensuring that it remains armed and capable of vetoing 
any proposed bill perceived to be a danger to the Party of God.
184
  
While Hezbollah defined itself as a jihadi movement, its ideas of jihad have 
changed. Since the Israeli withdrawal from the security zone in 2000, and after 2006, 
Hezbollah shifted from Lesser Jihad to Greater Jihad. That is, Hezbollah has 
(re)constructed its normative ideology from a violent pan-Shi’a movement seeking 
national liberation to a mainstream political party whose goal is to internally reform the 
Lebanese political polity. Resistance and jihad have become internalized despite 
Hezbollah’s jihad being historically constructed as an external struggle, manifested 
through violence. During Hezbollah’s early years (1978-1990) the movement focused on 
inner-spirituality, religious indoctrination, self-discipline, and obedience to God, Islam, 
and waliyat al- faqih. Greater Jihad also extended to the movement’s selection and 
enrolment process and recruitment. Upon recruitment into Hezbollah, trainees were 
required to engage in Greater Jihad as a means of self-enrichment in order to properly 
prepare for Lesser Jihad. Until then, Lesser Jihad was strictly prohibited.
185
 Beginning in 
1992, Hezbollah’s participation in Lebanon’s first general elections since the start of the 
civil war signaled a dramatic shift in jihad. Hezbollah’s Greater Jihad did not remain 
confined to the inner practices of the movement, but extended to the political application 
of fighting venality in the Lebanese political sphere. Soon after Israel withdrew from 
Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah was able to mobilize greater resources and fully engage 
in Greater Jihad, otherwise not possible because of occupation. Its goal in engaging in 
Greater Jihad in Lebanese domestic politics is to demonstrate that the Party of God is the 
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most dominant political force in the country.
186
 More importantly, Hezbollah understands 
that in order to continue constructing the process of resistance it must remain armed. 
Hezbollah remains steadfast in its promise to conquer Lebanon from the bottom up 
through pragmatism and democratic elections. Votes are required without alienating 
others, such as the Sunni and Christian communities. Hezbollah’s norm construction, as a 
result of its integration into the political sphere, shifted from moqawama Islamiyya 
(Islamic resistance) to moqawama Lebananiyya (Lebanese resistance). Consequently, 
Hezbollah is applying its policy of Lebanonization and is reconstructing jihad. The 
movement is reconstructing jihad as inclusive and “Lebanese.” Jihad has become a 
national project.     
To summarize, jihad’s operational changes, Hezbollah has shifted from Greater 
Jihad in 2001 following Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon to Lesser Jihad 
during the 34 day war with Israel in 2006. Shortly after, Hezbollah shifted again to 
unarmed struggle staging protests in the hopes of placing pressure on the Siniora 
government. Next, the movement employed armed jihad, which resulted in the death of 
100 people, to contest Siniora’s plan to shut down the group’s network. Beginning in 
2013, Hezbollah employed lesser armed jihad once again when it intervened in the Syrian 
conflict. This event illustrates not only a change in jihad, but also a shift in Hezbollah’s 
policy of Lebanonization. It reverted back to before 2005, when Hezbollah was 
constructed as a transnational non-state actor, serving the Syrian leadership. However, 
during this period jihad also reverted back to Greater Jihad. That is, following Siniora’s 
decision to grant Hezbollah’s demands, the movement swiftly shifted back to Greater 
                                                          
186 Alagha (a), 197. 
Elbenhawy 61 
 
Jihad, although currently Hezbollah practices lesser armed jihad in Syria. In 2006 the 
movement reached its peak as the region’s steadfast resistance movement par excellence. 
However, waging armed jihad in Lebanon and in Syria has quickly proved to be harmful 
to Hezbollah’s legitimacy as a resistance movement. Since 2013, Hezbollah has struggled 
to symbolize resistance in the region. Indeed, jihad in all its various forms is one the most 
important constructions in Hezbollah’s ideology.  
 
Martyrdom 
Martyrdom is an essential element of Hezbollah’s ideology. Despite the movement’s 
pragmatism, martyrdom remains one of the most important ways Hezbollah physically 
expresses its norm of resistance. The question of why Imam Hussein continued his 
journey despite the warnings, to Hezbollah, emphasizes his sacrifice made for the umma, 
as it was clear what his fate would be if he continued on to Kufa. The idea of the Karbala 
Drama
187
 is so prolific that without it, Hezbollah claims, there would have not been an 
Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.
188
 As constructed by Hezbollah, the Karbala Drama 
signifies resistance to oppression, humiliation, and living a life in disgrace. Hussein, 
through the use of jihad, embraced the virtue of martyrdom illustrating that life is not 
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worth living if one does not live with honour.
189
 The idea of martyrdom is only seen 
through the social construct of the Karbala Drama. Hezbollah, as a norm entrepreneur, 
uses the construction of Shi’a history to justify its norm of resistance. In other words, 
Imam Hussein’s martyrdom is a social construct, helping to construct a reality of 
martyrdom for Hezbollah to follow.  
For a comprehensive understanding of martyrdom, I combine Momen’s and 
Moussalli’s definitions. According to Momen, “‘the ultimate in [self]-sacrifice [altruism] 
is martyrdom, in which a person sacrifices his or her own life itself for religion’.”190 The 
highest and most decorated type of jihad in Islam is martyrdom. Moussalli explains that a 
martyr has a special place in Islam, as he or she is not judged for past transgressions, but 
instead is reserved a spot in paradise. Muslims historically and theoretically used 
martyrdom as a means of defending themselves and their property often against non-
Muslims.
191
 Notably, martyrdom operations, or suicide missions as they are named in the 
West are not exclusive to Islam. Historically, martyrdom operations have also been 
nationalistic in nature, aimed at ending imperial occupation. Examples include Chinese 
communists during the revolt in Shanghai, China in 1927, the Japanese Kamikaze during 
World War II, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and India, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
(PKK) in Turkey, and the Indian Babbar Khalsa International (BKI).
192
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Hezbollah has constructed four senses of martyrdom as thawabit. Thawabit refers 
to “immutable principles” or a set of recognized rules and norms.193 Discussing all four 
are out of the scope of this thesis, and thus, only the first two will be discussed.   
The first element of martyrdom deployed is al-shahid al-mujahid (martyr 
fighter).This is a Muslim engaging in Lesser Jihad who, while battling the enemy, dies 
on the battlefield but does not die by exploding himself. Instead, he is killed through 
conventional warfare, such as Hadi Nasrallah, son of Sayyed Nasrallah, who died in 1997 
while fighting an Israeli contingent. Hezbollah asserts that al-shahid al-mujahid is pious 
and performed an “altruistic and supererogatory act.”194 Al-shahid al-mujahid is neither 
washed or wrapped in traditional burial shroud, as per Islamic tradition, but is washed by 
the angels.
195
   
The second is al-istishhadi al-mujahid (the martyred fighter). This refers to a 
martyr engaging in Lesser Jihad by intentionally becoming a human grenade or by 
inflicting the most damage or deaths possible against the enemy on the battlefield until he 
dies. Hezbollah constructs al-istishhadi al-mujahid as a “hardcore altruist” who, similar 
to al-shahid al-mujahid, committed a “supererogatory act.”196 For Hezbollah, the 
martyred fighter sacrificed him or herself for the maslaha or benefit of his or her 
community and the umma. His or her sacrifice is constructed by Hezbollah as an action 
that is beyond the “call of duty,” as it is not incumbent on Muslims to engage in the act of 
martyrdom. Hezbollah affirms that the Prophet Muhammed enjoined that al-istishhadi al-
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mujahid is also not washed or wrapped in burial shroud, as the hadith reveals that the 
angles will wash him or her.
197
 Ayatollah Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah
198
 posits that a 
martyred fighter “‘differs little from that of a soldier who fights and knows that in the end 
he will be killed. The two situations lead to death; except that one fits in with the 
conventional procedures of war, and the other does not’.” Fadlallah continues, ‘“the 
Muslims believe that you struggle by transforming yourself into a living bomb like you 
struggle with a gun in your hand. There is no difference between dying with a gun in your 
hand or exploding yourself’.” He adds, “‘What is the difference between setting out for 
battle knowing you will die after killing ten [enemy soldiers], and setting out to the field 
to kill ten and knowing you will die while killing them’?”199 Fadlallah was not the 
architect behind martyrdom operations. They were first sanctioned for men and women 
by the Supreme Leader Khomeini who exploited their usefulness during the Iran-Iraq 
War enjoining that they signified the highest level of altruism for the sake of Islam. 
“‘[A]s Shi‘ites we welcome any opportunity for sacrificing our blood. Our nation looks 
forward to an opportunity for self-sacrifice and martyrdom’.” He added, ‘“red death is 
better than a black life’.”200 Thus, the difference between the two is that al-shahid al-
mujahid is a fighter “who falls on the battlefield while facing the enemy.”201 Al-istishhadi 
al-mujahid  is the willingness of a fighter to explode him or herself in an effort to inflict 
maximum damage on the enemy. 
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Hezbollah stresses that martyrdom is a selfless act, characterized by freewill and 
the preference of paradise over life. Hezbollah succeeded in stimulating this feeling of 
self-sacrifice through Greater Jihad, and as a result, there was no shortage of martyrs 
willing to die for Hezbollah. Through the social construction of the Karbala narrative and 
the fervor of religious discipline and devotion, Hezbollah is able to continuously 
construct the idea of martyrdom. By constructing martyrdom as a religious act of self-
sacrifice, in line with Greater Jihad, would-be martyrs are willing to sacrifice themselves, 
similarly to how Imam Hussein sacrificed himself for Islam. In addition, each martyrdom 
operation conducted by the Islamic Resistance must be accorded a fatwa, a religious 
edict, granted by the faqih or jurist in order for it to be considered martyrdom not 
suicide.
202
 Indeed, Hezbollah enjoys popular support by understanding that identity and 
perception are important elements in global politics. It is important for Hezbollah to be 
perceived as good Muslims by the Lebanese citizenry, dedicated to the preservation of 
the umma and Lebanon rather than as sinners who commit suicide. After all, who would 
be willing to die for an organization known for being heretical. Fadlallah justified 
martyrdom missions as legitimate, conducted under the umbrella of jihad. Martyrdom 
operations were designed to end the occupation of South Lebanon against the usurper of 
Arab lands by any means necessary. He further asserted that “‘a person must face power 
with equal or superior power. If it is legitimate to protect one’s life, land, and destiny, 
then all means of self-defence become legitimate’.”203 Fadlallah is legitimizing the norm 
of resistance and constructing a reality that martyrdom is religiously sanctioned under the 
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conditions of occupation by a superior military power. Resistance is made a political 
norm, by being made a religious norm.   
     As a preconstruction, Hezbollah has reconstructed martyrdom as an 
honourable act conducted as a means to self-determination in times of war. Martyrdom is 
defined and deployed as an act that cleanses one’s soul, a choice of the afterlife over 
worldly desires, and a choice to die with honour rather than live in shame perpetuated by 
occupation. Nasrallah reminds his supporters of a saying by Imam Ali: “‘one thousand 
strikes of the sword are easier than one death on the mattress’.”204 Unique to Hezbollah’s 
reconstruction of resistance is its use of Shi’a history, more specifically the self-sacrifice 
of Imam Hussein to free the umma from Caliph Yazid’s tyranny. This deviates away 
from the common understanding of martyrdom in Sunni Islam. Again, Nasrallah is 
reconstructing the norm of resistance by using religious symbolism to sanction the act of 
self-sacrifice. Hezbollah’s religious symbolism is not given, but rather its meanings are 
constructed and reconstructed continuously through narratives, edicts, and proverbs of 
religious leaders revered in Islam. By invoking the teachings of Imam Ali, Sayyed 
Nasrallah is constructing the norm of resistance as something divinely-willed. This is part 
of Hezbollah’s attempt to internalize the norm of resistance. If the act of self-sacrifice is 
religiously sanctioned, then politically it becomes a legal method of war in combating 
occupation, imperialism, and oppression. This is one way Hezbollah (re)constructs 
resistance as a norm.           
In November 1982, in the Southern city of Tyre, a white Mercedes strapped with 
explosives drove into an Israeli headquarters and intelligence center destroying the eight-
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storey building and killing 141 Israeli personnel. This would be Hezbollah’s first 
martyrdom operation. Hezbollah’s first contemporary martyr, Ahmed Qasir, shocked the 
Israelis who did not anticipate such an attack and did not understand what had happened. 
Israeli authorities continued for years to insist that the explosion was caused by a gas 
leak. In 1982, Hezbollah was not formally established and instead was composed of 
several factions that were clandestine, but the Party of God claims this operation as its 
own.
205
 This was part of Hezbollah attempting to construct itself. This would be the first 
of many martyrdom operations conducted by the Islamic Resistance until the final Israeli 
withdrawal in 2000. It is interesting to note that during Hezbollah’s early years (1978-
1984/5) a martyred fighter had to be able to kill at least 30 people for an operation to be 
categorized a religious martyrdom.
206
 Beginning in 1985 this was no longer a prerequisite 
for martyrdom operations. However, Sayyed Nasrallah asserts that martyrdom operations 
are not indiscriminate despite the eagerness of many young would-be martyrs. He 
contends that if the operation is not fruitful and does not inflict as much damage as 
possible against the enemy, then the operation is unsanctioned because it would be 
inhumane, legally and religiously. By extension, there are restrictions placed on 
martyrdom. Nasrallah concludes, “even when we perform jihad and seek martyrdom, we 
do so only in order to achieve victory,” which is a reward for Lebanon and the people.207 
For Hezbollah and Lebanese Shi’a, Israel signified oppression and represented the role of 
Caliph Yazid in the Karbala Drama and Hezbollah, as the symbol of resistance and 
mobilization, is the contemporary of Imam Hussein’s resistance to Umayyad rule.  
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According to Hamzeh, militant operations conducted by the Islamic Resistance 
reached almost 5,000 (4,928 to be exact) for the period between 1996-2000. Militant 
operations dramatically decreased from 2001-2004 where the number of operations 
hardly reached 20.
208
 In fact, the last martyrdom operation conducted by the Islamic 
Resistance was in 1999 and not in 2006 as many claimed.
209
 Obviously, there are changes 
in Hezbollah’s martyrdom. The first change is in Hezbollah’s religious construction. 
Martyrdom is no longer couched in religiosity as it once was in the early 1980s. 
Beginning in 1991, Hezbollah began to include nationalism as part of its policy of infitah 
and Lebanonization, justifying martyrdom as a national duty in contrast to exclusively 
relying on Islamic symbolism or the Karbala Drama. Hezbollah no longer uses religion as 
a justification for martyrdom. Instead, it is a national duty in the preservation of 
Lebanon’s borders initially from Israeli aggression, but now from Sunni extremists, such 
as the Islamic State. The umma has been replaced with protecting the honour and pride of 
the “nation.” Changing Hezbollah’s religious tone was a political strategy that was 
implemented prior to the parliamentary elections in 1992. Indeed, the Party of God felt 
that ideas closely associated with Shi’ism might alienate voters, notably Christian and 
even Sunni voters, therefore, they had to be quieted. Notably, this does not mean that 
Hezbollah dismissed religion completely, but it was commonly understood among all 
Lebanese factions, secular or Islamist, that the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon was 
scurrilous and humiliating.
210
  
                                                          
208 Hamzeh, 89. 
209
 Alagha (a), 87. 
210 Alagha (a), 199. 
Elbenhawy 69 
 
The most important change following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was the 
typology of martyrdom. Al-istishhadi al-mujahid is no longer used by the Islamic 
Resistance as the conventional weapon of war. Instead, Hezbollah emphasizes al-shahid 
al-mujahid as the contemporary method of warfare. Another important change involved 
the construction of the enemy. Following 2006, Hezbollah no longer battled what it 
called the “Zionist entity.” Instead, the resistance or the battle became more internalized 
and less regional. The shift occurred even before 2006. Following Israel’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah began to focus on domestic politics and Greater 
Jihad. This policy also included abandoning martyrdom and attempting to adapt and 
integrate into the Lebanese polity. Hezbollah was able to construct itself as a party able to 
adapt to an ever-changing environment. However, this changed in 2013 when Hezbollah 
actively involved itself in the Syrian crisis. Hezbollah’s focus shifted from resisting the 
alien entity in the Arab world, known as Israel, to resisting “terrorist” cells operating in 
Syria which Hezbollah constructs as proxies working to remove Bashar Al Assad from 
power. In line with the shift in martyrdom, Hezbollah’s fighters are no longer human 
grenades, but are battling the enemy as soldiers and dying on the battlefield from wounds 
and gunfire. This is in contrast to Ahmed Qasir who drove his Mercedes into an Israeli 
intelligence building, hoping to inflict as much damage as possible, while sacrificing 
himself in the process. The ultimate sacrifice the Party is making now is being involved 
in the Syrian crisis. Hezbollah initially constructed martyrdom as a purely religious duty. 
From 1985 to 1991, the Party of God changed its religious stance, while maintaining that 
self-sacrifice will lead to paradise. During this period, Hezbollah became more 
politicized, constructing the norms of pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, fighting oppression, 
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anti-Zionism, and anti-imperialism. From 1992 on, Hezbollah began advocating 
secularism and constructing a nationalistic agenda. Martyrdom is now constructed as a 
purely national duty, framed in the context of preserving the “nation’s” integrity and 
dignity (‘izzat wa karamat al umma). Fighting occupation through martyrdom was 
reconstructed as a nationalistic and religious duty. That is, martyrdom was constructed as 
a norm legitimized by preserving the dignity and honour of the nation that has been 
hindered by the shame of occupation.
211
 Hezbollah has continued constructing 
martyrdom in the context of nationalism, as evidenced in the Syrian crisis. Indeed, 
Hezbollah is not the first nor is it unique in framing martyrdom in nationalistic terms. 
Other Islamist movements who have constructed martyrdom as a national duty include 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Palestine’s HAMAS. Sayyed Nasrallah has repeatedly 
claimed that the Syrian crisis is a proxy war designed to destroy the country, its army, 
and its people.
212
 Against this backdrop, Hezbollah has intervened to help resist such a 
project from being realized. Hezbollah is constructing its involvement in Syria as an 
effort to protect Lebanon’s eastern border. Hezbollah contends that its intervention in 
Syria is intended to deter takfiri groups from crossing over into Lebanon. Accordingly, 
Hezbollah has stationed its fighters along the Lebanese-Syrian border. There are no 
shortages of Hezbollah fighters in Syria willing to sacrifice themselves for the social 
construction of Lebanese sovereignty. That is, and despite objections from some fighters 
unwilling to be deployed to Syria, Hezbollah continues to deploy fighters to Syria in a 
continued effort to rescue the resistance bloc and protect Lebanon’s border with Syria.   
                                                          
211
 Alagha (a), 199. 
212
 “Nasrallah: What is Happening in Syria Aims to Destroy It and Its People,            
      Society and Army,” Syrian Radio & TV, last modified, April 30, 2013,  
      http://www.syriaonline.sy/?f=Details&catid=12&pageid=5681. 
Elbenhawy 71 
 
Martyrdom, as a social construct, is one of the most important ideas in 
Hezbollah’s ideology. The Party of God sought to escape from its grassroots as a 
clandestine organization and express its pragmatism. To express its pragmatism, it was 
required for martyrdom to change, but it was never abandoned and remains a normative 
idea intimately involved with Hezbollah. By the same token, martyrdom is used until 
today, but is practiced differently from the days of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. 
Presently, al-istishhadi al-mujahid  has been abandoned in favour of a more 
contemporary style of warfare exhibited in al-shahid al-mujahid. Despite Hezbollah 
applying its policies of infitah and Lebanonization to martyrdom, the idea was never and 
will likely never be abandoned; like jihad, martyrdom was differently constructed 
according to the Lebanese political climate. Al-shahid al-mujahid, is, however, practiced 
currently in Syria against Islamic State (IS) and other “Sunni extremists.” Fuller and 
Francke offer an insightful argument that Shi’ism is inherently more rebellious than 
Sunnism. The authors note Shi’ism’s history of challenging Umayyad authority and 
power as proof that Shi’ism is predisposed to suffering and even coveting martyrdom as 
recourse to the Karbala Drama.
213
 Nevertheless, martyrdom is celebrated annually on 
November 11
th, the date Ahmed Qasir took his own life. Similar to the West’s 
commemoration of war veterans, Martyrdom Day serves as a reminder of the sacrifices 
made by the Resistance, but equally important it is the continuous reconstruction of 
Hezbollah’s ideas that have been physically expressed.214  
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The Oppressed/Oppressors Dichotomy 
Hezbollah has constructed a social structure of occupation by identifying itself as a 
resistance movement. As a resistance movement, it is attempting to challenge the Israeli 
occupation by any means. Hezbollah adopted the role of the oppressed while Israel had 
been, and continues to be, constructed as the oppressor. Adopted from Khomeini’s 
ideology, Hezbollah’s resistance is grounded in the dichotomy of the oppressed versus 
the oppressor. The dichotomy of oppression is reflective of the Karbala Drama, whereby 
Caliph Yazid symbolizes oppression and Iman Hussein signifies the oppressed.
215
 At one 
time or another, the Shah, the United States, Israel, and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have 
all been constructed to be Yazid, and Khomeini and his allies as the embodiment of Imam 
Hussein Ibn Ali.
216
 It is a reference to the Quranic theme of good versus evil locked in a 
zero-sum game of epic proportions whereby the oppressed defeat the oppressors. This 
division of the world was first articulated by Khomeini who constructed the identity of 
oppressed (mustad’fin) and the oppressors (mustakbirin). The dichotomy of oppression 
has been mentioned by Hezbollah in several speeches and the 1985 Open Letter and its 
1992 political campaign were addressed to the oppressed.”217 The construction of 
oppression in the 1985 Open Letter and Hezbollah’s 1992 political campaign were the 
same. In the 1985 Open Letter and in the 1992 political campaign, Hezbollah constructed 
itself as the champion of the peasant farmers, the labourers and the poor, the oppressed 
and deprived, the workers and homeless. The homeless Hezbollah are referring to are 
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those who have no homes as a consequence of Israeli bombardment.
218
 Hezbollah 
became known as the “voice of the downtrodden.” Hussein Al-Mussawi explains that 
oppression refers to the refusal of the downtrodden to be oppressed any further. 
Ironically, it was the Israeli invasion, occupation, and subjugation of the Shi’a citizenry 
that mobilized and even radicalized the sect, paving the way for the establishment of 
Hezbollah.
219
   
Hezbollah, Palestinian and pan-Arab liberation movements, and Islamists  
construct the Zionists as the ultimate oppressors. Hezbollah also constructs any rule that 
is unjust despite religion, race, or creed as oppressive. The same applies to the oppressed. 
Despite Khomeini’s dichotomy of oppression having its roots in the Quran, Muslims and 
non-Muslims who are socially and economically disadvantaged, politically oppressed and 
culturally deprived are considered oppressed, irrespective of their identity or culture.
220
 
Certainly, the Quran does not specify any religion or culture concerning oppression. The 
oppressed are also not exclusive to the Global South, but include the Global North as 
well. By extension, Iran was active in the 1990s aiding “oppressed” movements such as 
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, the National Islamic Movement in Sudan, 
HAMAS and Islamic Jihad of Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Al-Nahda in 
Tunis, and the Jihad group in Egypt.
221
 In the past, Iran has aided and supported South 
Africa’s Nelson Mandela, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Daniel Ortega, and Fidel 
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Castro who in the eyes of Iran were being oppressed.
222
 Iran is not only challenging the 
geopolitical order of the region by leading the Shi’a revival, but it has in the past 
bolstered support for non-Muslim social and even revolutionary movements. However, 
Khomeini and Hezbollah have constructed Israel as the first and ultimate oppressor, the 
cancerous growth that must be excised by all means. The second order oppressors are 
those who occupy land of the oppressed, but again the oppressors are not comparable to 
Israel whose very existence is believed to be illegal and illegitimate. The third order 
oppressors are dictatorships in the Global South who govern the oppressed with an iron-
fist and are Western-backed.
223
   
The invasion and occupation of South Lebanon by the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) and the South Lebanese Army (SLA) radicalized the Shi’a. As mentioned earlier, 
the norm of resistance is rooted in the construction of oppression and in the case of 
Hezbollah, resistance is also grounded in occupation. Hezbollah is constructing resistance 
within the context of occupation and imperialism. For instance, Hezbollah constructs the 
Shebaa Farms as Lebanese territory still under occupation. Consequently, Hezbollah must 
continue constructing resistance and remain armed in defense of Lebanese sovereignty. 
Another example is Hezbollah’s construction of the Syrian crisis as an imperial project 
designed to dismantle the Syrian state. Israel’s aggressive actions against the Shi’a in the 
South indeed demonstrated the dichotomy of oppression. In 1982, in an effort to keep the 
Shi’a obedient, Israeli forces imposed curfews, conducted wholesale arrests, house 
searches, and roadblocks. Economically, the Lebanese market was flooded with Israeli 
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commodities for the local population to consume.
224
 The most striking example of 
oppression came during the civil war between September 16 and 18, 1982 when Christian 
partisans under the tutelage of the IDF entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in a 
Southern suburb of Beirut that housed Palestinians and nearly a quarter of Lebanese Shia. 
Many residents of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps were shot, including women and 
children. In total 1,500 people died in what became known as the Sabra and Shatila 
massacre. This spurred the creation of radical forces, including Hezbollah, and 
reconstructed the Shi’a identity which initially welcomed the Israeli invasion, as they 
believed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) brought only more problems to 
Lebanon, especially the south. Afwaj al-Muqawmat al-Lubnaniyya (AMAL) was one of 
the forces that was displeased with the Palestinian Liberation Organization using South 
Lebanon as a launching pad to commit attacks against Israel. The misery of the Shi’a was 
chronic, as refugee camps meant for Palestinians swelled with Shi’a refugees escaping 
Israeli bombardment in the south, coupled with an economic blockade and the 
obliteration of southern agriculture. Currently a museum, Al-Khiam prison serves as a 
constant reminder of Israel’s and the South Lebanon Army’s oppression. This only 
further contributes to Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. Hezbollah continuously constructs 
the Al-Khiam museum as a place to remember oppression and occupation. The Al-Khiam 
prison could have been left as an abandoned site, for example, or converted back into a 
chemical plant following Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. Instead, Hezbollah and the 
Lebanese government chose to convert it into a museum. Al-Khiam prison helps 
Hezbollah’s case as a norm entrepreneur attempting to legitimize the norm of resistance. 
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According to Finnemore and Sikkink, one of the ways a new norm may be accepted is if 
it has intrinsic qualities.
225
 Al-Khiam prison, as a detention center designed to destroy the 
morale of the resistance through torture, violated all universal norms of behaviour, 
including human rights. Norms which have intrinsic characteristics, such as human rights, 
are more likely to be adopted or recognized. Through Al-Khiam prison, Hezbollah is 
legitimizing its norm construction by illustrating how the detention center symbolized 
oppression. To resist torture as a tactic of war is widely accepted. Al-Khiam prison 
constructs what Hezbollah has been resisting. Oppression is constructed as the backbone 
of Hezbollah’s resistance.  
Hezbollah’s construction of oppressed and oppressor has shifted. In Hezbollah’s 
construction, oppressors are often the colonizers or despotic rulers and the oppressed are 
referred to as the occupied or those who are economically and socially disadvantaged, 
and culturally deprived. According to Hezbollah, however, Israel is the embodiment of 
oppression, and therefore, Hezbollah’s construction of Israel as the ultimate oppressor is 
unchanged. Between the years of 1978 and 1984/5, Hezbollah constructed the Maronites, 
the United States, France, and Israel as the oppressors and the periphery states or the 
Global South as the oppressed. The French historically favoured the Christians, and thus, 
drafted Lebanon’s confessional system to allocate the majority of the political power to 
the Maronites. The Christian Maronites occupied the position of the presidency while 
their Sunni counterparts occupied the role of prime minister and the Shi’as were assigned 
the figurative role of speaker of the house. In a national consensus conducted in 1932, 
France as the colonial power at the time, included the Shi’as who resided in mainly 
                                                          
225
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and               
    Political Change, International Organization 52, No.4: 907. 
Elbenhawy 77 
 
Christian areas of Lebanon as Christian. In other parts of the country, the Shi’as were 
counted as either Sunni or Christians. The results, indeed manipulated, illustrated that the 
Shi’as were the third largest confessional group. The Shi’as held some power, but it was 
not an accurate representation of the community.
226
 The Shi’a community constructed an 
identity of the downtrodden as they were politically underrepresented, and as a result, 
third-class citizens. Hezbollah constructed the U.S. and France as oppressors because 
they were considered occupying forces under the pretext of peace-keeping during the 
civil war. The Global South was composed of colonial states formerly under British or 
French rule. It was also made up of states that were victims of U.S. aggression, such as 
Grenada, Nicaragua, and Iran. This changed in the years between 1984/5 and 1990 where 
Quranic expressions took precedence and terminology such as Great and Little Satan 
became metaphors. Great and Little Satan refers to the United States and Israel 
respectively.
227
 Hezbollah’s construction of oppression changed to be less political and 
more grounded in religiosity. Some verses from the Holy Quran (34:31-33) help to 
decipher between the oppressed and oppressor.
228
 From 1991 onwards, Hezbollah’s 
notion of oppressed did not change. However, the idea of oppressor shifted. During the 
civil war, Hezbollah constructed the Lebanese state, including political Maronism as 
illegitimate. Initially, Hezbollah condemned the Lebanese confessional system as 
oppressive, serving the interests of the Christian Maronites. Despite this, and with the 
encouragement of Fadlallah and permission from Khamenei, Hezbollah participated in 
parliamentary elections for the first time in 1992 and municipal elections in 2005. 
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Hezbollah is currently a member of the national multi-confessional cabinet with veto 
power. Internationally, France is no longer regarded as an oppressor or Great Satan, 
notably due to Iran’s recent nuclear deal and the warming of relations between the two 
states.
229
 This change reveals that a part of Hezbollah’s norm entrepreneurship relates to 
Iranian foreign policy. Since 2013, Hezbollah has constructed the Syrian people and the 
Syrian Arab Army as being oppressed by the GCC, the United States, and Israel. As the 
Lebanese once were, the Syrian people are now being oppressed by a civil war that is 
devastating the country with far-reaching implications. Syrians are not the only ones 
being oppressed. On April 17, 2015, Sayyed Nasrallah proclaimed Hezbollah’s 
unflagging support for the “oppressed” Yemeni people who are victims of Saudi-US 
aggression.
230
 The Yemeni people, according to Sayyed Nasrallah, are currently being 
bombarded by a Saudi-led campaign known as Operation Decisive Storm aimed at 
reinstating the President, Abdel Rabbah Mansour Hadi, who was forced into exile by 
Shi’a Houthi rebels backed by the former President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh. As a 
norm entrepreneur, the narrative of oppression is continuously being reconstructed 
according to Hezbollah’s changing domestic, regional, and international environments.    
Hezbollah has socially constructed a reality that the Syrian President and 
Yemen’s Houthis are victims of a wider project to overhaul the regional order of the 
Middle East. It is not necessarily important to determine who lies where in Hezbollah’s 
dichotomy of oppression, but to understand that oppression continues to be made a 
central theme in Hezbollah’s ideology. Until today, the region remains a target of 
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penetration through military bases, treaties, arms deals, and military intervention, such as 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
231
  
As a norm entrepreneur, the identity and norms of Hezbollah help to construct the 
normative idea of oppression. Fadlallah elucidates this point by positing that “‘oppressed 
people cannot always behave in a reasonable manner…the weak will fight to defend their 
interests, even if they have to use knives and stones to spread chaos throughout the 
world’.”232 As an agent once in a social structure of Israeli occupation, Hezbollah’s desire 
to construct its identity as the “party of the oppressed” and the “voice of the 
downtrodden” is intentional and appealing not only to the party’s local constituency, but 
to the Arab world that advocates for resistance as the only response to oppression, 
subjugation, and occupation. The social construction of oppression is demonstrated 
continuously through speeches conducted by Hezbollah, statements from the Quran, the 
annual commemoration of Martyrdom Day, and Al-Khiam museum. By socially 
reconstructing an identity of oppression, Hezbollah is reaching into the heart of Arab 
grievances as former victims of European imperialism and currently victims of Israel’s 
expansionist policies. Effectively, Hezbollah is reconstructing a reality of oppression in 
order to justify its resistance norm. Hezbollah is attempting to legitimize its norm of 
resistance by appealing to the oppressed of the world. Hezbollah is constructing 
resistance as a universally accepted response to oppression and occupation. As a norm 
entrepreneur, Hezbollah is claiming its resistance norm as universal.  
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Anti-imperialism 
Hezbollah’s normative idea of anti-imperialism has its roots in the Israeli occupation of 
Lebanon. The social structure of oppression and occupation created resentment and 
hostility and demonized Israel as the ultimate oppressor that needs to be stopped. More 
importantly, it is an entity that cannot and will not be recognized, as Israel is the usurper 
of Arab lands, including Palestine, the Golan Heights, and the Shebaa Farms. Tripp 
explains that resistance in any form is a means of trying to gain recognition of one’s 
dignity.
233
 The grievances held by Hezbollah do not only extend to the state of Israel, but 
to the Western powers, most notably the United Sates whose unequivocal aid and support 
has made Israel the most powerful state in the region. Hezbollah is determined to 
challenge the power of the United States and its ally Israel by countering their influence 
in the region. As previously mentioned in chapter one, the Party of God can be 
understood as being anti-globalization, anti-imperialist, anti-Western, and anti-Zionist. 
Due to its history as a resistance movement, Hezbollah has continuously reconstructed 
the identity of being the Vietcong of the Litani, in honour of Vietnam’s guerilla’s 
resistance movement during the Vietnam War (1965-1973) and in reference to South 
Lebanon’s river, the Litani River. The Party of God also lambastes Arab states that have 
had relations or peace negotiations with Israel, including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states 
who are often accused of being America’s collaborators in the region. The plundering of 
Arab resources, namely oil and water, by the United States and Israel only exacerbates 
matters further.  
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Hezbollah’s animosity to imperialism was made public in the 1985 Open Letter 
which was presented first as a public speech on February 16, 1985. In a section titled 
“Our History with the Imperialists,” Hezbollah began by stating “O humble and 
honorable oppressed” Hezbollah condemns the “crimes” committed by the United States 
in Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Grenada, Palestine, Lebanon and we also condemn Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, its interference with Iran’s affairs, its backing of the conflict 
with Iraq, and so forth.
234
 In regards to Israel, Hezbollah considers it the American 
foothold in the Muslim World. Israel, the master of Zionism poses the greatest risk to the 
Arab world, as the occupation of Palestine is only stage one of a grand expansionist 
strategy of establishing a Greater Israel which would include the Euphrates River in Iraq 
to the Nile of Egypt.
235
 The Party of God has an ideological battle with Israel as it is the 
party’s adversary since its inception, as it was established on stolen land at the expense of 
the Muslim umma. Hezbollah’s confrontation, therefore, with the Zionist entity can only 
cease to exist when Israel ceases to exist. By extension, the Party of God reserves the 
right to reject any cease-fire, peace talks, truce, and reject any communication with 
Israel.
236
 As an agent, Hezbollah must continuously reconstruct the social structure of 
occupation in order for the Party of God to remain armed and constructed as a resistance 
movement. Since Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, in large part, has ceased to exist as a 
social structure, the movement is in need of fresh conflicts to legitimize its norm of 
resistance. Its confrontation with Israel is ideological, but Hezbollah understands that the 
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existence of Israel provides legitimacy to its norm construction. In chapter one of the 
party’s Political Manifesto published in 2009 titled “Hegemony and the Awakening” 
Hezbollah explains that the United States sees the world as a marketplace in need of 
exploitation. Moreover, American hegemony is unique to the world because of its 
inherent belief that it owns the world and that Americans are naturally superior beings. 
Therefore, the Western and especially the American expansionist strategy conjoined with 
their capitalist economic plan is global in scale and is a strategy of unlimited exploitation 
and greed.
237
 Hezbollah is not only constructing a reality of political resistance, but there 
is also an economic dimension to its resistance. Sayyed Qassem unequivocally 
characterizes anti-imperialism as a dichotomy: the United States and Israel as engineers 
of an imperial project on one side and on the other the Islamic Resistance.
238
 Qassem 
explains that the US is able to spread chaos and destruction in the Middle East, extorting 
the region’s resources while attacking Arab regimes, political parties, and citizens. In 
response, Qassem enjoins that Hezbollah is steadfast in its decision to resist American 
exploitation. “Our legitimate right is in itself a source of power, and our logic is 
sound.”239 In response to the imperial-Zionist project or occupation by any force, 
Hezbollah insists that it is the right and duty of all peoples to resist occupation and 
exploitation, politically, culturally, and through education.
240
 As a norm entrepreneur, 
Hezbollah is constructing the norm of resistance by juxtaposing those who are occupying 
against those who are fighting occupation. Qassem is constructing a reality whereby 
resistance is a requirement meant to prevent American exploitation of the region and its 
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resources. Resistance, as it is being constructed, must be the response to more than just 
Zionist ambitions. Hezbollah is continuously constructing resistance as the logical 
response to safeguarding the Middle East from any form of exploitation. As a norm 
entrepreneur, Hezbollah is attempting to construct a reality of U.S. and Israeli 
imperialism. Kidnapping of Westerners, for example, during the civil war was 
Hezbollah’s way of constructing resistance to any Western presence in the country. 
Hezbollah also kidnapped Israeli soldiers, a strategy that proved fruitful in Hezbollah’s 
campaign of psychological warfare. Indeed, it caused an emotional burden on Israeli 
politicians and Hezbollah hoped that a backlash from the Israeli citizenry would 
eventually occur, calling into question the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Through 
kidnappings, Hezbollah manifested the norm of resistance to occupation.   
Hezbollah constructs Israeli occupation of Arab lands as humiliating and 
oppressive. Hezbollah constructs a reality that through armed military jihad and 
martyrdom, the threat of imperialism can be resisted. This position extends to Palestine 
and the duty to protect and preserve the third holiest site in Islam, Al Aqsa Mosque. One 
of the constructions in Hezbollah’s idea of anti-imperialism has been made to be 
combating Israel in an effort to liberate Jerusalem. Nasrallah has previously suggested 
that Hezbollah would be willing to send reinforcements, if necessary, to support its 
Palestinian brethren. When Sayyed Nasrallah was asked about the 1993 Oslo Accords, he 
rebuffed stating that “the land is our land and the holy sites belong to our nation; we want 
to live with our honour and freedom in our region of the world. We do not want to beg 
for peace and security…We want to forge our nation’s peace with our own blood, guns, 
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body parts, and bones; this is the peace we believe in and seek.”241 The idea Hezbollah 
mobilizes is that not one Arab state has managed to liberate an inch of Palestine since 
1948, which illustrates the ineffectiveness of negotiations. It also makes resistance the 
only feasible option when dealing with Israel.
242
 Hezbollah highlights Jerusalem’s 
religious significance to proffer representations that once Jerusalem is free, the umma is 
free. In a show of solidarity with Palestine’s claim to Jerusalem as its future capital, 
Ayatollah Khomeini created Jerusalem Day, and like Martyrs Day, it is a celebrated 
yearly in Iran and by Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
Imperialism is not a phenomenon exclusive to the West. Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf states’ Operation Decisive Storm is constructed to be yet another ploy by imperial 
powers aimed at partitioning Arab lands. Hezbollah is constructing a reality whereby 
Yemen is part of a wider US experiment: “We are confronting a new American scheme, a 
plan of occupation of unknown duration. The Americans are looking to establish 
permanent military bases-this means that we are facing not only occupation, but a further 
consolidation of the US presence.”243 Freeing Palestine is constructed to mean liberating 
Iraq, Syria, and Yemen from the vice grip of imperial powers. 
Thomas Homer-Dixon published an article in 1994 titled “Environmental 
Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.” His thesis was that future 
conflicts will erupt over natural resources, which over time become increasingly scarce. 
Homer-Dixon enjoins that depletion and pollution of water supplies may consequently 
cause “resource wars.” The author goes on to argue that out of the major environmental 
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changes facing the world, degradation and reduction in water supply, among other 
resources, will most likely contribute more to social upheaval than climate change or the 
depletion of the ozone layer.
244
 Homer-Dixon’s thesis of resource wars has not proven to 
be the norm; however, the depletion of water supply has been historically one of the 
underlying tensions between Lebanon and Israel. This, Hezbollah argues, is again part of 
Israel’s plan, to usurp not only Arab lands, but also Lebanon’s water supply. Again, 
Hezbollah is constructing a reality of an imperial Zionist plot to steal Lebanon’s water 
supply. This social construction allows Hezbollah to remain armed in an effort to resist 
Israel’s plan to usurp Lebanon’s water, even if land is not occupied. Thus, Hezbollah is 
constructing a social structure of continuous conflict, implicit or explicit, with Israel. As 
mentioned above, once Israel ceases to exist the confrontation with Zionism will cease to 
exist. However, Hezbollah, it seems, desires to reconstruct Zionism as a continuous threat 
to Lebanon, despite Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.  
 Israel has been enduring a water crisis since its inception. Even before the 
establishment of Israel in 1948, the Zionist movement was well aware that the future of a 
Jewish state would be in danger without a reliable water source. The reason for Israel’s 
sustained water crisis is Israel’s geography of semi-dry to complete desert coupled with 
high water demand. The Sea of Galilee provides over one-third of water and another one-
third comes from two aquifers, substantial geographical areas of underground catchments 
where water accrues. These lie beneath the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
245
 which were 
seized in 1967. In 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon “disengaged” from Gaza because 
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Israel could no longer siphon the amount of water for its demand. Gaza’s water quality 
was adversely affected by an increase in salt levels and pollutants, and therefore was 
rendered undrinkable and given back to the Palestinians.
246
 Despite seizing the Shebaa 
Farms in 1967, Israel’s solution remained a “well-watered” Lebanon to its north which in 
2006 would increase water supply by up to eight hundred million cubic meters (MCM) or 
roughly forty percent of its water consumption.
247
 The Israelis ultimately failed to capture 
the Litani River in 2006. Israel managed to pump Lebanese water to Haifa during the 
occupation of Lebanon. Water was why the occupation line was the Litani.   
The Shebaa Farms borders Lebanon and Syria from the side of the Golan Heights 
from the east and Israel from the southeast. Israel considered the Shebaa Farms as a part 
of the Golan Heights, and thus, part of the Syrian territory occupied in 1967. Hezbollah 
and the Lebanese and Syrian authorities have for decades disputed Israel’s claim that the 
Shebaa Farms is Syrian. They argue that the Shebaa Farms is Lebanese and Israel must 
withdraw from all Lebanese territory immediately, citing UNSC Resolution 425 which 
called on Israel to withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. The Shebaa Farms is 
22 square kilometers, comprising 2% of Lebanese territory. Israel refused to withdraw 
from the Shebaa Farms following May 25, 2000 arguing that it is Syrian territory and is 
part of the Golan Heights which was officially annexed in 1981. In a rebuttal, Syria sent a 
letter to the UN stating explicitly that the Shebaa Farms does not belong to Syria, but to 
Lebanon. In 2001, Sayyed Nasrallah asserted that it is Lebanese land and will be liberated 
by any means. Hezbollah, as a norm entrepreneur, is constructing Lebanon as a certain 
space that must be liberated through resistance. Moreover, it was through jihad and 
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martyrdom, Nasrallah explains, that the Islamic Resistance was able to force Israel to 
withdraw from Lebanese territory, not UNSC Resolution 425. Hezbollah is 
reconstructing the norm of resistance through the context of occupation and imperialism. 
Sayyed Nasrallah is reconstructing a social structure of occupation; that is, that Lebanon 
was never completely liberated in May 2000. Until the Shebaa Farms is liberated, the 
norm of resistance must continuously be constructed. According to Hezbollah, 
negotiations or land-for-peace deals are ineffective methods of diplomacy.  
The question remains why does Israel refuse to relinquish the Shebaa Farms? 
Despite its size, the Shebaa Farms is rich in water due to high levels of precipitation 
mainly accumulated from melting snow corollaries in major underground basins. The 
melted snow provides the ground with a number of springs and streams at lower 
elevations.
248
 Hermon Mountain provides much of the water for the Hasbani River, south 
of the Shebaa Farms where Israeli engineers have embedded pipes used to siphon 
hundreds of cubic meters of water directly into Israel. The Director-General of the Litani 
River Authority, Nassar Nasrallah explains that Israel moves two hundred million cubic 
meters (MCM) from Lebanon and from those two hundred, one hundred and thirteen 
million cubic meters (MCM) comes directly from the Shebaa Farms, Hasbani River, and 
Wazani Springs.
249
 Hezbollah refuses to dismiss Lebanon’s claim to the Shebaa Farms, 
although the UN has drawn a blue line effectively leaving the Shebaa Farms to Israel. 
Hezbollah continues to construct the Shebaa Farms as part of Lebanon. This construction 
allows for Hezbollah to remain armed and allows for ongoing jihad. Sayyed Qassem 
states that it is not acceptable to Lebanon or Hezbollah that Lebanon remains occupied. 
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From Hezbollah’s perspective, relinquishing any territory is non-negotiable, despite 
where it is located and how valuable the land may be. Occupation must end.
250
  
The Shebaa Farms remains a point of contention for all parties involved, 
especially Hezbollah which constructs the reality that it has not completely liberated 
Lebanon from Israeli occupation. The Party of God asserts that it will remain armed until 
the Shebaa Farms returns to Lebanon. Critics accuse the pan-Shi’a party of using the 
Shebaa Farms as a pretext to remain armed. Indeed, Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur 
understands that without arms the party can no longer construct the norm of resistance 
and to keep its arms, some part of Lebanon must be occupied. A movement cannot be 
“resistant” without an arsenal of weapons at its disposal. Following Israel’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon on May 25, 2000, Hezbollah continued to conduct operations in the 
Shebaa Farms area stating that it will not stop until Israeli forces withdraw from the 
Shebaa Farms. As a norm entrepreneur, the continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms is 
offering the legitimacy needed for Hezbollah’s continuous norm construction. Resistance 
by way of jihad and martyrdom are constructed as the only options when responding to 
Israel’s intransigent imperialism.  
Certainly Hezbollah’s position on imperialism has shifted over the years. From 
1985 until 1991 the party implemented “Westoxification,” however, from 1991 and on 
the Party of God adopted a policy of less Westoxification regarding France and the 
United Kingdom and the implementation of infitah regarding imperialism and Western 
Europe. As forces involved in the civil war began to withdraw their troops, Hezbollah 
quieted its construction of Westoxification. Westoxification referred to the spread of 
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Western cultural ideals. Hezbollah constructs the idea that the influence of Western 
culture is determinantal or toxic to Islamic values and to the livelihood of Islam. The 
United Kingdom was constructed as an experienced imperial power that exploited 
“defeatist Arab regimes” in the Gulf in an effort to usurp the regions resources.251 
Hezbollah’s construction of Westoxification as a normative idea is based upon the French 
and American troops that were stationed in Lebanon as a part of the UN peace-keeping 
mission, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Hezbollah’s animosity to 
the West extended to non-governmental organizations as well which were once 
constructed as agents of Great and Little Satan.
252
 That is, NGOs that operated in 
Lebanon during the period of Westoxification were constructed as extensions of U.S. and 
Israeli foreign policy. Consequently, Hezbollah arbitrarily rejected NGOs operating in 
Lebanon. Instead, Hezbollah offered similar services offered by Western NGOs. In 1992, 
however, Hezbollah, in an effort to construct itself as a pragmatic resistance movement, 
began “opening up” and began integrating into Lebanon’s political landscape. The 
integration into the Lebanese polity meant that Hezbollah accepted the state’s institutions, 
confessional system, the Taif agreement, and the state’s civil institutions. The use of 
religious metaphors such as Great and Little Satan emphasizes what Hezbollah constructs 
as a battle between the forces of good and evil, where the oppressed are blessed with a 
divine victory (Nasrallah). It is important to recognize that the hostility towards the 
United States is directed at the administration not the American people. Hezbollah’s 
Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council, Sheikh Nabil Qaouk, avers that the United 
States is a myriad of nations that hold various opinions regarding U.S. foreign policy. For 
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instance, there are millions who sympathize with the Palestinian cause and there are 
many who reject America’s policy of interventionism. Therefore, Sheikh Qaouk asserts, 
Hezbollah cannot judge America as a whole.
253
 However, the animosity towards Israel is 
directed at the government and at society. Hezbollah perceives that anyone living in 
Israel is willingly and willfully living on stolen land, and is therefore, complacent in 
contributing to the continued despair of the Palestinian people. Hezbollah’s construction 
of the United States and Israel remains unchanged.  
In Hezbollah’s Open Letter, the party constructed the UN as faithfully serving the 
interests of the West, the United States, and Israel at the expense of the oppressed. As a 
result, Hezbollah discarded the UN Charter. When the Open Letter was released, 
Hezbollah’s identity was clandestine. Presently, however, and concomitant with its 
commitment to pragmatism, Hezbollah openly expresses its commitment to the 
International Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the UN Charter.
254
 The United 
Nations is an organizational platform which Hezbollah may use to promulgate its norm of 
resistance. One of the functions of the United Nations is to recognize and uphold 
universal norms, such as sovereignty and the responsibility to protect. It is in the interest 
of Hezbollah to construct the UN as a legitimate organization. Its commitment to the 
UDHR and the UN Charter helps construct the Party of God as a legitimate political actor 
not only in Lebanon, but in the region and in global politics. If it did not uphold the UN 
Charter, Hezbollah would be further alienating itself from international society. If it 
wishes to conquer Lebanon from the bottom up and continue constructing the norm of 
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resistance, then Hezbollah must construct itself as legitimate political actor. If not, 
Hezbollah would be reduced again to a clandestine militia, and like other militias from 
the civil war, the pan-Shi’a party would be forcibly stripped of its weapons. 
Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah asserts that Israel is in constant violation of the UDHR and the 
UN Charter. In a form of norm contestation, Israel also constructs Hezbollah as a violator 
of human rights. Hezbollah understands that identity and norms are critical in global 
politics, and therefore, as a part of its policy of infitah and pragmatism, it was critical for 
Hezbollah to abide by universal norms. The Party of God also willfully cooperates with 
local and international aid agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
which were previously considered instruments of Western exploitation.
255
  
Hezbollah’s continued campaign of anti-imperialism has become regional and is 
manifested in its involvement in Syria. Hezbollah fighters cannot battle Israel and 
simultaneously be involved in Syria. Consequently, it has concentrated its forces in Syria 
where the situation is pressing. There, Nasrallah constructs Hezbollah as resisting an 
imperial project orchestrated by Great and Little Satan and their imperial stooges, Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf states. According to Hezbollah, the GCC’s intervention in Yemen 
entrenched Arab states for the first time as contemporary imperialists. To this end, 
Hezbollah’s politico-ideological concept of anti-imperialism has shifted to include Arab 
states. Again, the shifts in Hezbollah’s ideology are largely reflective of dynamic changes 
in Hezbollah’s regional relations, such as the Syrian conflict and the Houthis’ attempt to 
                                                          
255 Alagha (a), 196. 
Elbenhawy 92 
 
oust President Hadi from power. The changes witnessed are examples of Hezbollah’s 
ability to adapt and contribute to an ever-changing environment.   
In sum, Hezbollah constructs itself as a pan-Islamic and pan-Arab movement 
determined to challenge the dominance of Israel and the United States and their allies in 
the region, including the GCC. Sayyed Qassem asserts that the “project of hegemony” led 
by the United States is designed to subdue Lebanon and the region, enforce the 
recognition of the “Zionist entity,” impose normalization of relations with the Zionists, 
dilute our (Arab) identity and rich civilizations, conjoining our (Arab) fate with the 
Western economies and industries, ensuring expropriation of our (Arab and Muslim) 
nation’s wealth and resources, replacing heads of states and implementation of 
programmes.
256
 Indeed, Lebanon and other Arab states remain targets of imperialism for 
the exploitation of the region’s natural resources, such as water and oil.  
Hezbollah has a legitimate claim that as long as the Shebaa Farms is occupied 
then the norm of resistance must continuously be reconstructed. Today there are still 
Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons, there are virtually daily violations of Lebanese 
airspace by Israeli drones, and the Shebaa Farms remains occupied.
257
 These are all 
reasons why Hezbollah’s resistance must continuously be under construction. In essence, 
as long Hezbollah is able to continually construct a reality of occupation and construct 
Israel as the usurper of Arab lands and a threat to the region’s water supply then it will be 
able to continue constructing its resistance norm. Hezbollah’s social construction of 
occupation of the Shebaa Farms enables the Party of God to remain armed as a legitimate 
resistance movement. Consequently, Hezbollah remains the most dominant political force 
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in Lebanon. That being said, Hezbollah constructs the complete liberation of Arab lands, 
including Palestine, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq as pivotal to its norm of resistance. This 
ensures that the anti-imperial struggle is far from over. As Tripp explained in chapter 1, 
where power goes, resistance must follow. The two are dialectically related. In all, 
Hezbollah is a product of imperialism and Hezbollah needs imperialism.     
 
Conclusion 
Hezbollah is no longer directly resisting Israel, but instead claims to be resisting the 
Israeli-American project of balkanizing the Middle East. The dichotomy of oppression 
has also changed. The oppressors, often constructed to be the United States and Israel 
remain unchanged, but Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have recently been represented 
as oppressors as a consequence of their involvement in Yemen. The oppressed are not 
necessarily Lebanese, as was the case during Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, but the 
Syrian and Yemeni people. The oppressed, therefore, have also changed. Again, the shift 
in oppression is clearly a result of the changes in Hezbollah’s environment. As mentioned 
above, Hezbollah has survived and will likely continue to survive due to its innate ability 
to reconstruct itself and its ideology concomitantly with its changing environment.      
The US, Israel, and Canada have listed Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Hezbollah is 
constructing Al Assad and the Yemeni people as the latest victims of an American-Israeli 
plan to partition the Middle East into mini-protectorates. The idea of anti-imperialism 
also shifted. The Party of God remains steadfast in constructing the United States and 
Israel as manifestations of Satan (Great Satan and Little Satan) primarily due to their 
imperial ambitions in the Middle East. In the 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah proclaimed its 
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refusal to recognize inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), but its tone swiftly 
changed and came into line with Lebanonization and infitah. Hezbollah openly expresses 
its commitment to the UDHR and the UN Charter and to working closely with aid 
agencies. In chapter 4, Hezbollah’s norm of resistance is physically expressed in the 2006 
war with Israel and the ongoing Syrian conflict.  
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Chapter 4-The Physical Expression of Resistance 
 
The Contestation of Norms in the 34-Day War 
 
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel as a diversion. Next, 
fighters of the Islamic Resistance crossed the “Blue Line” and entered Israel. (The Blue 
Line is the demarcation along the border between northern Israel and southern Lebanon.) 
The resistance fighters ambushed an Israeli patrol car in an uninhabited area of northern 
Israel, killing three soldiers and arresting two others. The IDF was alerted that the Blue 
Line had been violated and a rescue chase ensued into Lebanon where another five Israeli 
soldiers were killed and a Merkava tank destroyed. Tactically, the operation was a 
success.
258
 The operation illustrated how daring Hezbollah can be, but also exhibited the 
group’s offensive abilities. Israel, too, wanted to illustrate its offensive capabilities and 
did so with disproportionate force. Immediately following Hezbollah’s daring mission, 
Israel imposed an air, land, and sea blockade effectively isolating Lebanon from the rest 
of the world. Israel then began carpet bombing Lebanon’s infrastructure. A European 
Union (EU) assessment revealed that in the South the “IDF destroyed or damaged1,489 
buildings; 21 out of 29 bridges over the Litani River; 535 sections of road and 545 
cultivated fields.”259 All of the runways of Beirut’s Rafiq El Hariri international airport 
were bombed and six essential highways were damaged.
260
 Organizational platforms such 
as Al-Manar TV and fifty-one publishing houses associated with Hezbollah were also 
destroyed. Schools, universities, and other institutions of higher learning affiliated with 
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Hezbollah were also bombed.
261
 By destroying centers of learning, Israel is contesting the 
construction of norms by attempting to disturb norm emergence in the norm lifecycle.  
Israel’s blockade and the deployment of ground troops was not enough to curtail 
Hezbollah’s resistance. To strengthen its ally, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards bypassed 
Israel’s blockade and delivered hundreds of rockets to Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s norm of 
resistance was manifested, as fighters fired 4,000 rockets into northern Israel over the 
course of the war. Consequently, and as part of its campaign of psychological warfare, 
Hezbollah effectively instilled fear into the Israeli psyche, forcing more than two million 
to flee their homes to places of refuge and/or underground bunkers. In fact, according to a 
BBC documentary, in 2006, Israel suffered the heaviest aerial offensive since its 
inception in 1948.
262
 Despite this, Lebanon incurred more than $15 billion in damages 
and lost revenues from tourism and sluggish economic activity.
263
 1,109 civilians lost 
their lives and 4,339 were wounded. The official death toll for Hezbollah fighters cannot 
be confirmed, but it is estimated by the number of funerals for fighters that approximately 
184 fighters died as a result of the war.
264
   
By kidnapping two Israeli soldiers, Sayyed Nasrallah was hoping to pressure 
Israel into a prisoner exchange, hoping that all Lebanese resistance fighters left in Israeli 
prisons would be released. Furthermore, Nasrallah stated that his decision to commit such 
a bold act was partly done to express solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza who were 
attacked by the IDF on June 25, 2006.
265
 More importantly, however, Hezbollah 
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committed a bold act to revive the norm of resistance which had lost power since May 
2000. Hezbollah’s dangerous mission was also intended to revive other norms, such as 
pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. A bold action was required to regain respect from 
supporters and allies and to reconstruct its norms and identity as the premier resistance 
movement, national, regionally, and internationally.
266
 Alagha avers that “Hizbullah’s 
identity and raison d’être as an Islamic jihadi movement warrants such a precept of 
practice.”267 Nonetheless, Hezbollah never anticipated such a level of aggression from 
Israel. Indeed, Nasrallah hinted that a similar operation was forthcoming on April 24, 
2006, in an effort to secure the release of Samir Quntar, a senior member of the Islamic 
Resistance, from Israeli prison. It is not the first time Hezbollah has kidnapped Israeli 
soldiers. Colonel Elhanan Tennenbaum, for instance, was abducted in 2000 and only 
released in 2004.
268
 If kidnapping is a customary occurrence, what made Israel react in 
such a disproportionate manner in 2006? Similar to Hezbollah’s attempt to revive its 
norms, Israel, too, attempted to maintain the status quo as the most powerful state in the 
region. To do so, it must constantly reconstruct its identity and combat Hezbollah. 
Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon six years earlier hindered its identity as a 
military power in the region and reversed its identity of “fighting Jew,”269 to a national 
identity of vulnerability in a hostile environment.
270
 An alien entity in the Middle East, 
Israel sought to reconstruct its identity and re-establish itself as a military force in the 
region by swiftly defeating the only enemy that has forced it to withdraw from occupied 
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territory without a land-for-peace deal. Thus, it was critical for its identity construction to 
illustrate its military might and forcibly disarm the Party of God. The Israeli-Lebanese 
war was not only a contestation of norms, but also a contestation of identities.    
Israel constructed Hezbollah as terrorists attempting to provoke and terrorize 
Israelis by kidnapping two of its soldiers in a pre-emptive attack. Both, however, cannot 
construct the Other or contest each other’s norms without having meaningful interaction. 
In this case, it is warfare that is the meaningful interaction. In response to “terrorism,” the 
2006 war was the most destructive war Israel has waged against Hezbollah and Lebanon 
since first invading the country in 1978. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert understood that it 
was his last chance to destroy Hezbollah and reconstruct Israel’s identity as fighter of 
terror. Hezbollah provided this pretext by acting first. In September 2006, Prime Minister 
Olmert ordered an “objective” investigation into the war to review any wrongdoings, 
known as the Winograd Commission. Olmert’s testimony during the Winograd 
Commission revealed that his administration had been planning to go to war with 
Hezbollah as early as March 2006, four months before the war actually took place.
271
 
Israel constructed the war as being provoked, but instead Israel’s goal was to exterminate 
Hezbollah by any means necessary. By constructing Hezbollah as terrorists, Israel is 
absolving itself from any wrongdoing. Thus, basic norms such as human rights or 
sovereignty can be violated in the name of combating terrorism. For Israel, the war was 
constructed as fighting terrorism and bringing home Israel’s “children,” but Olmert’s 
revelation and Israel’s disproportionate response, illustrates that Israel was seeking to 
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contest Hezbollah’s norm of resistance physically. Israel constructs its own norm of 
resistance, which is resisting Hezbollah’s terrorism.  
Hezbollah constructed the war as a battle between the oppressed and oppressors 
and between the Muslim umma and the “‘Zionist invaders,’” the “‘corrupters of the land 
and the killers of the prophets’.”272 By doing so, Hezbollah validated the use of lesser 
jihad and martyrdom in order to defend the umma which is under attack. Again, 
Hezbollah was attempting to construct itself as defender of the umma against invaders, 
but also to garner support for its cause from Muslims across the world. It was through 
intersubjective meanings that Hezbollah constructed the Other. If Hezbollah constructs 
Israel as Zionist invaders, Hezbollah’s reconstruction of jihad, martyrdom, oppression, 
and anti-imperialism have helped reconstruct Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. However, 
its policies of Lebanonization and infitah and its position in the Lebanese government 
have elevated the Party of God from a clandestine movement to legitimate political party. 
By extension, Hezbollah is now able to exchange the “terrorist” charge with Israel, in a 
form of norm contestation. The label of terrorist is constructed by those who exercise 
disproportionate political power, not by those who are subjected to it. Hezbollah’s use of 
terrorism is illustrative of its renewed political power that is reinforced by its arsenal of 
weapons. Throughout the war, Israel and Hezbollah accused the other of terrorism. 
Hezbollah constructed Israel as an aggressor who violates basic norms, targeting civilians 
and infrastructure, while exploiting the use of American-made cluster bombs to attack the 
enemy. By attacking Lebanese infrastructure, even in Christian neighbourhoods, and 
attacking Hezbollah’s bastions, Israel was attempting to systematically deconstruct 
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Hezbollah’s legitimacy. By bombing Shi’a and Christian neighbourhoods and state 
infrastructure, Israel was to attempting to rally supporters and detractors of the movement 
to rebel against Hezbollah’s raison d'être. It is similar to Hezbollah’s tactic of utilizing 
psychological warfare to terrorize and provoke the IDF into unilaterally withdrawing 
from Lebanon. Israel, too, is attempting to terrorize the Lebanese citizenry by sowing 
discord between the citizenry and the Islamic Resistance. The contestation of norms are 
not only characterized by competing ideas, but are also manifested on the battlefield.  
Despite Israel’s response, the international community, including the United 
States and Canada, was firmly behind Olmert. In an attempt to strictly police Hezbollah, 
the status quo powers in the region, such as Egypt, Jordan, and the GCC states also 
voiced their opposition to what was constructed as a provocation.
273
 However, Nasrallah 
made a “‘Faithful Promise” in 2001: ‘“We are people who don't leave our prisoners 
behind’.” Therefore, once the opportunity presented itself, Nasrallah seized it.274 On 
August 5, 2006, in an attempt to resolve the crisis, former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora 
proposed the Seven Point Plan. Siniora’s plan called for the deployment of 15,000 
Lebanese troops to monitor the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon. The Lebanese 
Cabinet unanimously accepted Siniora’s plan. Historically, the party consistently vetoed 
any proposal involving the deployment of Lebanese troops along the southern border. 
Hezbollah argued that the army’s presence along the border only served to protect Israel 
from rocket attacks fired by the Islamic Resistance.
275
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The war finally concluded with the implementation of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006. UNSC Resolution 1701, among other 
things, called for a cessation of violence and for a UNIFIL force of up to 15,000 soldiers 
to be deployed to the Blue Line. One of Israel’s objectives for going to war was to 
forcibly implement UNSC Resolution 1559 (September 2, 2004), which, among other 
things, called for Hezbollah to disarm. During the Cabinet meeting two of Hezbollah’s 
ministers voted ‘yes’ for UNSC Resolution 1559 and UNSC Resolution 1701. One of 
Hezbollah’s goals was to survive the war and remain intact. Nasrallah argued that 
Hezbollah’s acceptance of Lebanese troops to be deployed to the south, as previously 
demanded by Israel, and its acceptance of UNSC Resolution 1701 ‘“serves the national 
interest since the strength of Lebanon is in its resistance and national unity’.”276 This 
position is reflective of Hezbollah’s policies of Lebanonization and infitah.277 Hezbollah 
is reconstructing itself as a pragmatic political party that is seeking to serve the interests 
of the state over its own.  
 Hezbollah constructed Israel as the aggressor, contending that as long as the 
Shebaa Farms remains occupied, resistance fighters remain in Israeli jails, and Israel 
withholds the landmines maps, then the resistance must continue and the Party of God 
will remain armed.
278
 For Hezbollah, the provocateur in the war was Israel. Hezbollah 
stresses that Israel’s war was planned in advance. Nevertheless, Israel and Hezbollah 
miscalculated each other’s capabilities and Nasrallah confirmed that if he had understood 
the magnitude of Israel’s response, Hezbollah would have not committed such a bold 
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act.
279
 Nonetheless, the Party of God constructed the war as a “Divine Victory” for the 
Resistance, emphasizing the victory not only for Hezbollah, but also the Muslim umma. 
Nasrallah stated that the conflict “‘surpass[ed] Lebanon . . . it [was] the conflict of the 
umma’.” Hezbollah’s Divine Victory provided a new lease on life for its norm 
construction. Its resilience and its will to survive Israeli bellicosity helped revive 
Hezbollah’s norm of resistance which had been losing power since Israel withdrew its 
forces in May 2000.  Its resistance appealed to the Palestinians, while the party’s 
popularity exploded in the West Bank and Gaza and across the region. Hezbollah re-
symbolized resistance in the region.
280
 The 2006 war disseminated Hezbollah’s norm of 
resistance across the Middle East. Its willingness to accept Siniora’s Seven Point Plan 
and UNSC Resolution 1701 reflects the party’s commitment to its policies of infitah, 
integration and Lebanonization.
281
 Ultimately, Israel failed to achieve its objective of 
disarming Hezbollah and subsequently eradicating the party’s norm of resistance. The 
majority of Lebanon (87% of Lebanese, including 89% Sunni and 80% Christian)
282
 
favoured Hezbollah’s response to the Israeli aggression. The contestation of norms 
between Hezbollah and Israel proved beneficial to Hezbollah’s resistance. The Party of 
God emerged intact and armed with increased normative ammunition. Despite Israeli 
efforts, Hezbollah’s reconstruction of resistance, if anything, was strengthened by the 
war. Once again, Hezbollah rekindled and re-symbolized resistance in the Middle East.  
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Rescuing the Resistance Bloc from the Syrian Crisis 
Anti-government protests began in the southern city of Deraa, Syria in March 2011.
283
 
The ripple effect of the so-called Arab Spring had reached Syria as it had reached Tunisia 
and Egypt before it. The protests swiftly gained momentum and within a few months the 
protests were widespread and violent. Nasrallah stood by the protesters in Tunisia and 
Egypt, voicing his support for the will of the people. However, once the protests reached 
Syria, Nasrallah quickly changed his message and summarily condemned the protests. 
The Party of God began constructing the conflict as an imperial project, engineered by 
the United States and its allies in the region. Nasrallah accused Saudi Arabia of waging 
proxy wars across the Middle East, including in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria by 
materially and militarily supporting armed Islamist movements.
284
 Currently, Saudi 
Arabia’s “proxy” war has manifested itself in Yemen, which is actively being bombed by 
the GCC, led by Saudi Arabia. No longer was Hezbollah’s norm construction directed 
solely at Israel, but now at the “imperial project” designed to remove Al Assad from 
power. Hezbollah constructed Israel, Turkey, and the GCC states as principal culprits in 
the imperial project.
285
 As early as May 2011, Hezbollah pledged its unwavering support 
for Al Assad.
286
  
The geo-political relationship between Hezbollah and Syria is based upon mutual 
identities and norms. Following several failed attempts to reclaim the Golan Heights, Al 
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Assad closely aligned Syria with Iran and Hezbollah. “For strategic and ideological 
motives, Syria is more pro-Hizballah than Hizballah is pro-Syria.”287 By aligning itself 
with Hezbollah, Syria hoped to remain relevant in the regional order of the Middle East 
and reclaim its spot as a regional player, especially following Hezbollah’s Divine Victory 
in 2006.
288
  Hezbollah receives substantial ammunition from Iran, while Syria serves as 
the conduit between the two parties, helping to deliver weapon shipments to Lebanon. 
What defines their relationship is not Shi’ism. Rather, what defines their relationship is 
the norm of resistance. Another member of the bloc is HAMAS. However, military 
cooperation with HAMAS ceased, its funds were reduced, and HAMAS was temporarily 
removed from the resistance bloc for its opposition to Al Assad and its support and 
alleged training of opposition fighters in Syria.
289
  
Similar to Hezbollah, the resistance bloc resists oppression, anti-imperialism, and 
Zionism. By extension, Iran and Hezbollah’s eagerness to bolster Al Assad in Syria’s 
protracted conflict is not an attempt to further sow sectarian discord in the region, but 
rather to rescue the resistance bloc which is categorically at risk if Al Assad is removed 
from power. Syria remains one of the few Arab states in the region allied with Iran. As 
norm entrepreneurs, Iran and Hezbollah must ensure that Al Assad remains in power, at 
least for the time being, if the resistance bloc wishes to continuously reconstruct the norm 
of resistance and continue challenging the status quo powers. The conflict is not only a 
crisis for Syria, but also for Iran and Hezbollah. 
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Hezbollah’s reconstruction of the enemy has changed. Since its inception, its 
norm of resistance has been directed at Israel. Following Israel’s withdrawal in 2000 and 
Hezbollah’s Divine Victory in 2006, the party has struggled to construct a threat which 
would require its norm of resistance.
290
 Syria’s conflict provided this pretext and the 
Syrian government and Hezbollah began constructing the Syrian opposition as 
“terrorists” and takfiris. Only those in positions of power with relative legitimacy can 
accuse the Other of being a terrorist. The idea that Hezbollah is able to deploy the label of 
terrorism as a political tool, attests to its empowerment and position as being part of the 
Lebanese established order. With the addition of IS and al-Nusra Front forming another 
element of the Syrian opposition, Hezbollah’s construction of the enemy as being 
“terrorist” has gained some legitimacy. Hezbollah has compared the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA), one of the principal opposition groups to Al Assad, to the defunct South Lebanese 
Army (SLA), averring that that they have collaborated and conspired with the “enemy” 
against the Syrian state.
291
   
Nasrallah constructed Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian conflict as a 
necessity, invoking the party’s Divine Victory in 2006, promising that the same would 
happen in Syria.
292
 The Syrian government welcomed the intervention, as Al Assad 
needed to bolster his offensive against the opposition which had been constructed as 
“armed gangs.”293 In line with its policy of Lebanonization, Hezbollah constructed its 
involvement as a defensive measure to protect Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria. The 
Party of God also argued that it was entering the war to offer refuge to those Lebanese 
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citizens, who are mostly Shi’a, who reside in Syria. Hezbollah also argued that it had to 
enter Syria’s conflict in order to protect Shi’a holy sites, such as the Sayyida Zeineb 
shrine from being desecrated by takfiris. Not coincidentally, the Sayyida Zeineb mosque 
is strategically located in southeastern Damascus.
294
 Most Hezbollah attacks in and 
around Damascus originated from the location of Sayyida Zeineb.
295
  
Hezbollah’s objectives in Syria are twofold: 1.) Hezbollah seeks to rescue Al 
Assad from being removed from power; and 2.) Hezbollah hopes to continue receiving 
material support from Iran and Syria by regaining access to its support lines connecting 
Damascus to Beirut. Support lines connecting the two capitals were overrun by rebels. 
Hezbollah’s resistance depends upon these routes to carry weapons and other 
ammunitions which help construct the party’s norm of resistance.296 In a speech delivered 
on May 25, 2013, Nasrallah lucidly explained why Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is 
necessary: ‘“Syria is the rear guard of the resistance, its backbone, and the resistance 
cannot stay with its arms folded when its rear guard is exposed’.”297 Nasrallah continued 
by stating that Hezbollah is entering a new phase in the war: ‘“the phase of fortifying the 
resistance and protecting its backbone’.”298  
Hezbollah has confined itself mostly to Al Qalamoun Mountains and Damascus. 
Strategically, it has stationed all of its fighters on the western side of the Syrian-Lebanese 
border. Hezbollah has no active military presence in the north or northeast Syria, where 
IS has a strong presence. Hezbollah’s involvement was immediately felt on the 
                                                          
294
 Sullivan, 18.  
295
 Sullivan, 20. 
296
 Sullivan, 5.  
297
 Sullivan, 16.  
298
 Sullivan, 16.  
Elbenhawy 107 
 
battlefield, scoring a string of victories in rebel-held territories in central Syria, and 
proving to be an asset to Al Assad, who, up to 2013, was slowly losing his grip on power. 
The Islamic Resistance has operated openly with Syrian armed forces, Iraqi fighters, pro-
government militias, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.
299
  
To date, Al Qusayr represents Hezbollah’s “Divine Victory” in Syria since its 
intervention in 2013. Al Qusayr is a small town in Homs governorate which, until 2013, 
had been held by rebel forces. The besieged town served as a smuggling route for rebels, 
importing arms, ammunition, and fighters. Some of the fighters smuggled into Al Qusayr 
were Lebanese nationals. Thus, recapturing Al Qusayr was as important to Al Assad, as it 
was to Hezbollah, especially since it borders Lebanon. Protecting the border with 
Lebanon and its Shi’a villages in Syria is one of Hezbollah’s stated objectives.300 The 
battle of Al Qusayr, led by Hezbollah, inflicted maximum psychological damage on the 
rebels who also suffered heavy losses. It was a significant victory for Al Assad, whose 
forces, in 2012, attempted to regain the town, but were unable to completely recapture it. 
According to Sullivan, Hezbollah fighters are often better trained, disciplined in jihad, 
and experienced than their allies in the war.
301
 However, this is the first conflict in which 
the Islamic Resistance is using military style equipment, such as tanks. The Party of God 
has assisted the Syrian forces in Halab, Homs, Deraa, Damascus, and has conducted 
“anti-insurgency” operations in Al-Qalamoun Mountains.302 Hezbollah also offers light 
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infantry, conducts reconnaissance missions, and undertakes sniper fire. Hezbollah also 
trains Syrian soldiers and provides reinforcements to regime forces.
303
  
The war has taken its toll on Hezbollah’s fighters and on its identity construction. 
In a 2014 interview with Assafir, Nasrallah admitted that the war has been a “double-
edged sword;” on one side the Islamic Resistance has gained valuable experience in 
military theatres, and the other Hezbollah’s credibility as a resistance movement has been 
tarnished in the Arab world,
304
 especially in Sunni states. The gains made from the 2006 
war have been sacrificed by its engagement in Syria which has proven to be divisive. 
Consequently, Hezbollah’s legitimacy is at risk if it chooses to continue its involvement 
in Syria. It is worth noting that the majority of Lebanon’s Shi’a, which make up 
Hezbollah’s rank-and-file, favour the party’s involvement in Syria. This initially was not 
the case. Incidents of car bombings in 2014, in Beirut’s suburb of Haret Hreik, a 
Hezbollah stronghold, give legitimacy to Nasrallah’s claims that if Hezbollah does not 
take the fight to Syria, the fight will come to Lebanon. This has helped to construct the 
takfiris as an existential threat, similar to how the Zionists are a threat to Hezbollah.
305
 
The question worth asking is: would takfiris be a threat to Lebanon if Hezbollah did not 
intervene in Syria? The question is especially relevant, when examining the series of car 
bombings which have occurred in southern Beirut since the start of its military campaign 
in Syria. Official figures of Hezbollah fighters or Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
“martyred” in Syria cannot be confirmed, but funerals held in Lebanon provide an 
indication of how many have died so far. According to reports, approximately 1,263 
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to1,280 “martyrs” had died as of October 2015.306 On December 15, 2015, Israel 
estimated the death toll to be estimated around 1,300 to 1,500 and the number of injured 
to be 5,000. When numbers are tallied they reveal that a third of all Hezbollah fighters are 
either dead or injured as a result of Hezbollah’s involvement in the war. In the hope of 
rescuing the “backbone” of the resistance bloc, Hezbollah is willing to sacrifice its norm 
of resistance and its fighters.  
As a result of its controversial involvement in Syria, Hezbollah’s resistance bloc 
has also been adversely affected. The majority of Palestinian movements, including 
HAMAS, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and Jihadi Salafis vehemently 
oppose the Al Assad regime. For example, on December 4, 2012, Ansar Allah, a 
Palestinian jihadi salafi movement, distanced itself from Hezbollah and sent “would-be 
martyrs” to battle government forces. Constant clashes with HAMAS, the PLO, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) are indications of cooling 
relations between Hezbollah and its allies in Palestine.
 307
 During the siege of Al Qusayr, 
Hezbollah fighters suspected that HAMAS had provided training to rebel fighters. Many 
of the rebel’s defensive tactics used in the battle were familiar tactics used by HAMAS, 
which HAMAS itself adopted from Hezbollah. Despite HAMAS being a part of the 
resistance bloc, in May 2013, Iran subsequently slashed a portion of its funding (15 
million pounds) in response to HAMAS’ aid and material support of rebel forces in 
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Syria.
308
 Thus, a dilemma has ensued: Hezbollah and Iran are attempting to rescue the 
resistance bloc, but risk alienating HAMAS and other Palestinian factions that hope to 
topple Al Assad’s regime. The resistance bloc will be affected, and consequently, 
Hezbollah’s norm of resistance and identity construction as the defender of the umma 
(defensive jihad) and of Jerusalem is in jeopardy, especially across the Sunni world. 
Quantum Communications and Sofres Liban polling agency conducted two 
surveys across Lebanon between the months of February and May 2014. Respondents 
were asked one question: “Are you for Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria?”309 The sample 
population used was 1,500 across all demographics. Overall, 56% of respondents oppose 
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria. Twenty-eight percent of respondents support 
Hezbollah’s involvement. In regards to the party’s constituency, 61% of Shi’as support 
the party’s intervention. In the first round of polling, 22% of Shi’as opposed the party’s 
intervention, but that number increased in March to 25%. Southern Lebanon was more 
inclined to favour intervention (71%) than the Beqaa (44%), another Hezbollah 
stronghold. In the first round, 82% of the Sunni demographic opposed Hezbollah’s 
decision to enter the war, while the Christians and the Druze also opposed the war, 61% 
and 63% respectively. In the second round, 86% of Sunnis disapproved, 53% of 
Christians, and 64% of Druze also disagreed with Hezbollah’s war in Syria.310 
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria was never a popular decision, even among its own 
constituents, but the party has constructed its involvement in Syria as a mechanism of 
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deterrence against a threat posed by the status quo powers and takfiris that will eventually 
reach Lebanon. Nasrallah contends that “only stupid people wouldn’t” defend 
themselves.
311
 In a speech in 2013, Nasrallah enjoined that takfiris were a threat to all 
Muslims, Sunni or Shi’a. For Hezbollah, it is the norm of resistance which is at risk. 
Nasrallah has constructed the conflict in non-sectarian terms: “The dispute in Syria is 
between two sides, two axes, two projects, it is not between Sunnis and Shia[s], it is not 
between sects.”312  
Being a member of the resistance bloc has complicated Hezbollah’s norm 
construction. It is also apparent that Hezbollah is facing difficulties in constructing the 
norm of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism or state sovereignty. Hezbollah’s intervention in 
Syria has compromised its norm of resistance and has undermined its dichotomy of 
oppression. By involving itself in the war, Hezbollah has assisted in fomenting sectarian 
discord in the region, categorically undermining its norm of pan-Islamism and 
“buttressing the state sovereignty of the regime.”313 Hezbollah has placed itself in a 
difficult position with no end in sight. By entering the war, Hezbollah has done little to 
stop the war or reduce the number of deaths as a result of the conflict. The perception is 
that Hezbollah is no longer a symbol of resistance in the region, but rather shifted from 
resistance to being a puppet of the Al Assad regime. For many, resistance is defined as 
challenging tyranny and oppression. Hezbollah is reconstructing resistance as means of 
rescuing a dictatorship from an American-Israeli plot to dismantle Syria. The wide appeal 
Hezbollah enjoyed in 2006 has since waned due to its alternative definition of resistance.       
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Despite Hezbollah fatalities, Nasrallah reaffirmed in November 2013 that 
Hezbollah would stay in Syria “‘as long as the reasons [to fight in Syria] remain’.”314 
Indeed, the resistance bloc has proved to be an asset to regime forces. Al Assad began 
2014 in a stronger position than the previous year because of battles won in Damascus 
and Qalamoun in March 2014 which have helped to solidify the regime’s control of the 
strip stretching from Damascus to Homs and coastal cities.
 315
 It seems that sacrificing its 
norm construction, its alliance with Sunni and Palestinian factions across the Middle 
East, its symbolism as a resistance movement, and over a 1000 “martyrs” is worth it as 
long as Syria remains intact. Hezbollah has continued reconstructing its norm of 
resistance through the social structure of the Syrian war, but its involvement has 
ultimately damaged its legitimacy as the voice of the downtrodden.  
 
Conclusion 
  
Ideas matter when they are exercised socially. However, ideas may have strong appeal, 
but are not realized or exercised until circumstances permit. Martyrdom in Islam, for 
example, remains a significant idea even if it is not materially expressed by every 
Muslim. For the continuous reconstruction of resistance, it is imperative for Hezbollah to 
construct an enemy, such as Israel, the United States, takfiris, Turkey, and the GCC. By 
constructing an enemy, the Party of God is justifying its physical resistance. In 
Hezbollah’s war with Israel in 2006, it constructed the war as retaliation for past 
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aggressions and land still occupied by the “Zionists.” In Syria, the Party of God is 
attempting to rescue Al Assad from being toppled. In both wars, there have been 
numerous martyrs willing to sacrifice themselves for what is constructed as a legitimate 
cause. Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria and its support of the regime have adversely 
affected its legitimacy in the Arab world, sacrificing its norms and identity construction, 
while alienating its Sunni allies, such as HAMAS. By alienating HAMAS and other 
Palestinian factions, Hezbollah is alienating the Palestinians in Gaza. In doing so, it 
undermines the continuous construction of Hezbollah as a defender of Jerusalem and a 
staunch advocate for the Palestinian cause. Hezbollah’s popularity in Palestine has 
dwindled since 2006, primarily due to its military involvement in Syria. By involving 
itself in Syria, Hezbollah has helped foment sectarian tensions in the region, sacrificing 
its norms of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. Consequently, legitimacy gained by 
resisting Israeli bellicosity in 2006 has been sacrificed to rescue Syria from a plot 
engineered by the United States, Israel, IS, the GCC states, among others, to attack Syria 
first and once their objectives have been achieved Hezbollah will be next.
 316
 In 2006, 
Hezbollah managed to reconstruct and re-kindle its norm of resistance successfully, and 
as a result, its popularity soared across the Middle East. However, the Syrian crisis has 
only alienated Hezbollah from its Sunni allies, and more importantly from the Sunni 
community in Lebanon with many of its fighters returning in coffins, it does not seem 
long before the party must re-evaluate its involvement in the Syrian conflict. Syria’s 
conflict challenges the party’s legitimacy as a political party. For the first time it seems 
contradictory that Hezbollah would be a member of the Lebanese cabinet and be military 
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involved in a war. It is because resistance is constructed to be a defensive measure 
manifested in defensive jihad. Hezbollah’s involvement is not defensive, but rather pre-
emptive under the pretext of deterrence. This calls into question Hezbollah’s credibility 
as a resistance movement and its idea of anti-imperialism. Syria’s war is causing 
Hezbollah’s norm of resistance to conflict with its other norms. There is a contradiction 
between Hezbollah managing its policy of Lebanonization and politicization and its 
regional military involvements. Both cannot be realized without risking the movement’s 
norm construction and legitimacy.  
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Chapter 5-Conclusion 
I have analyzed Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East. My research 
question was: how does Hezbollah function as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East? 
Phrased differently, how does Hezbollah create the norm of resistance? The Party of God 
constructs and reconstructs its norm of resistance through institutionalized ideas. Ideas 
are then physically expressed. Ideas analyzed included jihad, martyrdom, the 
oppressed/oppressor dichotomy, and anti-imperialism. The party physically expressed its 
norm of resistance during the Hezbollah-Israel war in 2006 and currently in Syria where 
the party is battling what it has constructed as takfiris or “terrorists,” also known as the 
Syrian opposition. Hezbollah’s ability to construct its enemies as terrorists attests to its 
power and position as a part of the Lebanese established order.   
I used social constructivism to examine Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. It 
helps fill the lacuna in the corpus already published on Hezbollah. Most published works 
on Hezbollah are neoliberal because of how broad and encompassing neoliberalism is, in 
contrast to neorealism’s narrow and state-centric analysis of global politics. 
Neoliberalism and social constructivism recognize non-state actors in global politics, but 
constructivism’s ontology analyzes ideas, norms, and identity, which are pertinent to my 
study on Hezbollah. The construction of ideas, norms, and identity have been ignored in 
mainstream analyses of Hezbollah.  
It is difficult to discuss the regional order of the Middle East without examining 
Hezbollah. It has proved to be, if anything, the most powerful political force in Lebanon 
and a critical member of the resistance bloc. To adapt to its ever-changing environment, 
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Hezbollah had to reconstruct its identity and emphasize its commitment to infitah, 
Lebanonization, and pragmatism. It has managed to reconstruct its clandestine identity 
and become a mainstream political actor. Its ability to adapt to a dynamic environment is 
one of the reasons it has survived more than thirty years. Despite its changes, its 
resistance to Israel and the United States has remained largely unchanged. By the same 
token, its norm of resistance has shifted several times over the course of its history. The 
party has signaled a shift in its norm of Islamism, from moqawama Islamiyya (Islamic 
resistance) to moqawama Lebananiyya (Lebanese resistance). Shifts in Hezbollah’s 
ideology can be attributed to Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, which shifted the norm 
of resistance from a regional or external struggle for independence to an internal one, 
seeking more political power. It can also be explained by its desire to attain greater 
legitimacy by pursuing the bottom-up approach and conquering Lebanon through the 
ballot box rather than by force.  
Introduced in 1991, Hezbollah’s policies of infitah and Lebanonization have been 
instrumental in shaping and evolving Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. Simultaneously, 
Hezbollah contends that its pan-Shi’a identity is in line with Lebanonization and that one 
does not contradict the other.
317
 As a norm entrepreneur, the policies of infitah and 
Lebanonization signaled a change in the party’s norm of resistance. If the party remained 
steadfast in its ideology and resistant to change then the Party of God would have been 
unable to adapt and remained a militia. One of its true successes is the party’s ability to 
maintain a regional alliance with Syria and Iran, while simultaneously appealing to 
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voters. Hezbollah eventually became a member of the cabinet, reserving the right to veto 
legislation. Being able to evolve and implement change is critical and remains an integral 
element of the party’s continued success. 
Hezbollah exercised Greater Jihad from 2001 to 2006. In 2006, Hezbollah 
engaged in Lesser Jihad during its war with Israel. In 2008, Hezbollah’s resistance 
shifted to the domestic sphere, taking the form of protests against the Siniora 
government. From 2009 on, Hezbollah practiced Greater Jihad in the domestic sphere. In 
2011, Hezbollah’s constructed the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as legitimate 
revolutions seeking to uproot tyranny and corruption. However, once protests began in 
Syria, Hezbollah’s support shifted from the people to the government. Once it involved 
itself in Syria, Hezbollah shifted its resistance construction, from domestic to regional. 
Hezbollah has engaged in Lesser Jihad in an effort to protect its borders with Syria, 
rescue the resistance bloc, and disrupt what it constructs as a U.S.-Israeli engineered 
project to dismantle Syria and then attack Hezbollah.  
Hezbollah’s normative idea of martyrdom also shifted. The most important 
change was in the typology of martyrdom. Al-istishhadi al-mujahid has been replaced 
with al-shahid al-mujahid as the appropriate method of warfare. Hezbollah’s principal 
enemy is no longer Israel, but now includes “terrorists” or takfiris. Hezbollah’s ability to 
label the Other as terrorist or takfiri is illustrative of its power as a part of the Lebanese 
established order. This power manifested itself in the 2006 war which comprised a 
contestation of norms between Israel and Hezbollah. The GCC has also become a 
principal enemy because of its support of the Syrian opposition and its current military 
campaign in Yemen. For the first time, Hezbollah’s construction of anti-imperialism 
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includes Arab states. Initially, the social construction of sacrifice was constructed as an 
act of religious conviction. From 1985 to 1991, Hezbollah, emphasized that the act of 
self-sacrifice would be rewarded with paradise. The social construction of Imam 
Hussein’s role in the Karbala Drama was used by Hezbollah to religiously sanction the 
act of martyrdom or self-sacrifice. From 1992 on, Hezbollah applied infitah and 
Lebanonization to martyrdom, constructing it as a national duty to preserve the nation’s 
borders, integrity, and dignity (‘izzat wa karamat al umma). Similar to jihad, martyrdom 
remains an integral element in Hezbollah’s ideology and norm entrepreneurship.  
The Party of God has continued to construct the umma as oppressed. Currently, 
Hezbollah constructs the Syrian, Palestinian, and Yemeni people as oppressed. Hezbollah 
has constructed the status quo powers as the oppressors, including the GCC, Turkey, 
Israel, and the United States. Israel remains the embodiment of oppression. The 
dichotomy of oppression has provided the necessary pretext for Hezbollah’s norm of 
resistance. As the voice of the downtrodden, the Party of God must resist what it has 
constructed as oppression by the powerful. Again, where there is power, there is 
resistance. Hezbollah continues to resist the continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms 
which Syria, Lebanon, and Hezbollah claim to be Lebanese territory. Israel’s continued 
occupation of the Shebaa Farms provides the legitimacy needed for Hezbollah’s 
construction of resistance. Hezbollah’s idea of anti-imperialism has changed from 
resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon to resisting what it has constructed as a U.S.-
Israeli project designed to balkanize the Middle East.    
The norm of resistance reached its peak following Hezbollah’s so-called Divine 
Victory in 2006. On 25 May 2013, Hezbollah officially announced its military 
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involvement in Syria in an effort to rescue the resistance bloc, protect Shi’a shrines, deter 
“terrorists” from committing an attack on Lebanon, and protect Lebanese citizens in 
Syria. Syria has proved to be a divisive issue in Lebanon, with the 56% of Lebanese 
opposing the party’s intervention. As a result, and with swiftness, its norm of resistance 
has begun to wane. The momentum gained by its Divine Victory in 2006 is lost and it has 
alienated itself from its Sunni allies, including HAMAS. Syria’s conflict has undermined 
Hezbollah’s norm construction and has contradicted its dichotomy of oppression. By 
involving itself in the war, Hezbollah is fueling sectarian discord in the region and 
undermining its norms of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism. The rescue mission has proved 
to be a costly endeavour for the resistance bloc, with Hezbollah carrying much of the 
burden.  
Future research trajectories may examine how the continued occupation of the 
Shebaa Farms has impacted Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. Other areas of future 
research may analyze Hezbollah’s norm construction and how the Syrian war has caused 
the norm of resistance to conflict with other norms, such as the norm of pan-Islamism and 
pan-Arabism. The norm of pan-Islamism invokes the unity of the Muslim umma, whereas 
the norm of pan-Arabism advocates for the unity of Arabs. Another future research 
trajectory may analyze Hezbollah’s construction of the enemy. Hezbollah has historically 
constructed the enemy to be Israel or the United States, however, Hezbollah has recently 
constructed new enemies, such as the GCC states and Sunni extremism. How does 
Hezbollah construct new enemies and why? How does it affect its norm of resistance? 
Future research is required on Hezbollah’s continued involvement in Syria. By battling 
on the side of the Syrian regime, how does Hezbollah’s continued involvement in Syria 
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contradict its norm of resistance? As a norm entrepreneur, how will Hezbollah strengthen 
its norm of resistance which has waned since 2013?  More importantly, are norms being 
redefined by other groups? That is, are other groups successfully redefining resistance 
better than Hezbollah? Are other ideas or norms supplanting the idea of resistance, such 
as democratization? Does Israel remain the principal enemy in the region or has it been 
replaced with resisting domestic governance and corruption in the Arab world? An 
example of resistance to domestic governance was the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. 
Another example may include resistance to the Lebanese confessional system which is 
constructed as being outdated.  
Hezbollah’s policies of infitah, Lebanonization, and pragmatism have proved to 
be critical to the party’s success as a norm entrepreneur. Through the implementation of 
these policies, the Party of God has been able to construct and reconstruct its normative 
ideology. All three ideas are indispensable to Hezbollah and will continue to be 
reconstructed according to the party’s political environment. However, its victories in the 
Lebanese political arena and on the battlefield are at risk and if more fighters continue to 
return in coffins Hezbollah may have to rethink its commitments to the resistance bloc, 
but more importantly to its constituency, which has helped to legitimize the party. The 
party needs to regain the trust of its constituents and unify its rank-and-file which has 
suffered a schism over the Syrian crisis. The construction and realization of ideas will 
only be successful if they are perceived as legitimate. Without the perception of being 
legitimate, the Party of God is reduced to being a militia once again. Without legitimacy 
and political support, Hezbollah will be perceived as a terrorist organization. Something 
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the party has always challenged and detested. Indeed, the Syrian conflict is the 
Resistance’s Achilles heel.  
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